From *Thumos* to Emotion and Feeling. Some Observations on the Passivity and Activity of Affectivity

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**Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to examine several philosophical interpretations in order to show how affectivity has been considered in its relations to activity and passivity throughout the history of European philosophy. The major problem is that there is a tendency to conceive affectivity either as exclusively active or as exclusively passive. On the other hand there is often a coincidence between a term used in order to describe affectivity and the passive or active nature ascribed to affectivity as a whole. Besides the terms pathos, passio, passion, affectus, there are more recent categories of emotion and feeling, on the one hand, and thumos used before Aristotle on the other. The solution in order to avoid downwards as well as upwards reductions is to interpret affectivity as a multifaceted phenomenon and to acknowledge that affectivity presents different features on several levels.

1. In this paper my intention is to make some observations from a historical perspective about the confused issue of the relation of passivity and activity to affectivity. First I shall present a series of illustrations and raise some questions as to the way in which both categories have been applied to affectivity. At the end I shall refer to a more comprehensive interpretation of affectivity which allows the reconciliation of its passive and active dynamics.

The translator into English of one of the major chapters on affectivity, written in the Late Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas and titled in Latin *De passionibus animae*, E. D’Arcy, explains in his *Introduction* (2006, vol. 19, xxii and vol. 20, 16): “St Thomas frequently treats the *passiones animae* as a sub-division of *passio*, passivity, being-acted-upon [...] as opposed to *actio*, activity [...]”. However, D’Arcy (2006, vol. 19, xxii and vol. 20, 17) notices that: “[...] St Thomas frequently speaks about the *passiones animae* as acts [...] acts which are common to man and the other animals [...]” This would suggest, of course, that the *passiones* fall into [...] *actio*. Since D’Arcy is well aware that: “On the other hand, St Thomas often speaks of them as contrasting with, or parallel to, *actiones*”, he concludes: “I do not think that this is an inconsistency; I think that St Thomas consistently assigns the *passiones* to the tenth category, *passio*; but he does not see them as pure inert passivity [...]”. Is it to say that we should, therefore, postulate something as a mixed category: a not–inert passivity?
As to his choice of the English term in the translation he queries: “Should one render it *passiones* passions or *emotions*?” and he remarks (D’Arcy 2006, vol. 19, xxi and vol. 20, 16):

[...] affections and feelings are possibilities, but not very serious ones. Affections, on the one hand, is too restricted; to apply it to hope, despair, fear, daring, or anger would be rather odd [...] Feelings, on the other hand, extends too widely. In one direction, it applies as readily to purely physical feelings as those experiences or states which St. Thomas calls *passiones animae* [...] In other directions, the English feelings applies to non-objectified moods like foreboding, anxiety, or boredom [...] therefore, the choice for the English translation of *passiones animae* lies between passions and emotions [...].

With the above illustration I intend to draw attention to the entanglement of the issue. It pertains to the very nature of affectivity as well as to the problems associated with the vocabulary. However, one can say that the complexity of the relation between passivity and activity does not involve only affectivity, but it also concerns for example Aristotle’s distinction between active and passive intellect. As was indicated by David Gallop (1999, 103) “[t]he point of this distinction remains obscure [...] he [Aristotle] gives the impression of wrestling with problems rather than presenting cut-and-dried solutions [...]”.

2. Generally, it can be assumed that activity is linked to the process of creating and passivity to the process of receiving. Reception is dependent on the object, creation on the subject. But both, as had been posited by Plato, are powers (dunamis). In fact, for Plato the power of acting and the power of being affected are two basic characteristics of being: “I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.” In Aristotle we meet these two characteristics as the last two of his categories, the ninth and the tenth: “[...] how active, what doing (or Action), how passive, what suffering (Affection)”. The examples Aristotle gives are respectively: “‘Cuts’ or ‘burns,’ again, indicates Action, ‘is cut’ or ‘is burnt’ an Affection.”

Another example could be added, as for example that of delivering a lecture and of listening to a lecture delivered by someone else, especially when it is given in a foreign language. Thus we get a sight of the difference between passive and active knowledge. The power to produce is greater than the power to understand what is produced by someone else and what I am unable to produce myself. With this distinction the following observation of Max Scheler (1992, 92) fits in quite well: “[...] the pleasure the generator takes in the process of creating is greater than the pleasure others find in his product, for he will take his work as “finished” only when the joy inherent in creating begins to diminish for him.”

In what follows I am not going to focus on linguistic problems. My subject is categorial: has passion/feeling/emotion/affection (or whatever name we give to the phenomenon) been understood as passive or as active? If I was keen to avoid linguistic associations and prejudices and to be able to investigate in any language (English, German, Greek, Italian, French, Polish, Latin etc.), I would and should label
the general category by an invented term or symbol. In order to present some pieces towards reconstructing a kind of historical panorama, I begin with Thomas Aquinas.

3. According to Aquinas, *passion* can be expressed verbally in several ways:

More strictly, the word *pati* is used when a thing acquires one quality by losing another; and this may happen in two ways. Sometimes the quality lost is one whose presence was inappropriate in the subject: for example, when an animal is healed, it may be said to ‘undergo’ healing, for it recovers its health by shedding its illness. At other times, the opposite happens: for example, a sick man is called a ‘patient’ because he contracts some illness by losing his health. It is this last kind of case which is called *passio* in the most correct sense. [...] the remark *thinking and understanding are in some sense passions* applies to that kind of passion which involves reception pure and simple. Those kinds of passion in which some quality is lost, however, always involve some bodily change [...] the bodily change may be for the better or for the worse; and it is in the latter case that the term *passion* is used more properly. Thus sorrow is more naturally called a passion than is joy.4

Thereby, *passion* in some, general sense means reception. In a more strict sense passion means undergoing a change. But the most correct sense of passion is to undergo a change for the worse. We have, therefore, three grades of passivity: receiving (P1), receiving and being affected by this reception (P2), receiving and being affected by this reception for the worse (P3). But there are problems here. The first one is a terminological ambiguity of the word: it should be specified in each case in which of three senses, the broadest (P1), a narrow one (P2), or the narrowest (P3), the word *passion* is understood. If not, marking thinking and understanding, being joyful and being sad with the label *passion* can mislead.

The second problem is to consider that the distinction between P1 and P2 is not based on the same principle as that between P2 and P3. While the difference between P1 and P2 relies on, say, modalities (reception alone versus reception and being affected), the difference between P2 and P3 relies on the quality of the second modality. P3 means *being affected for the worse*. But what does P2 mean in this case? Does it include P3 and then mean *any change, for the better as well as for the worse*, as can follow from its distinction from P1, or does it exclude P3 and then means *only such a change which is for the better*? In the latter case I should offer a different division and instead of P1, then P2, then P3, I should say: P1, and then on the one hand P2i and on the other hand P2ii. In the former case P3 would be represented twice: in P2i, as received and being affected without considering whether it is affected for the better or for the worse, and as a distinct, narrower than P2 subdivision: P3.

The result of such an approach is that, on the one hand, we act inappropriately when we ascribe the category of passion both to joy and to sorrow, because they are not passions in altogether the same way. On the other hand, it could be asked whether an evaluation *in deterius* and *in melius* of psychic phenomena because of the character of their result is a good criterion for their classification. It could be objected that if affective phenomena differ by the quality of change by which they are identified, they should be distinguished symmetrically (P2i and P2ii), as opposition and not as a broader class and a narrower class (P2 and P3). One risk of doing so is that we arrive at
a situation where the category of passion is understood *ex definitione* negatively because it is connected with deterioration rather than amelioration. If, now, we merge this difficulty with the previous one, namely that of a weak distinction between $P_2$ and $P_3$ (or between $P_{2i}$ and $P_{2ii}$), we will see that all affective phenomena, even those which are changes for the better, are easily considered through a kind of shift as negative. One could ask whether such a position is not the source of a negative view of emotions over the centuries.

4. In another major work, *The Passions of the Soul*, Descartes affirms from the very beginning that

[...] all which is done, or happens anew, is by the philosophers called generally a passion in relation to the subject on whom it befalls, and an action in respect of that which causes it. So that although the agent and patient be things often differing, action and passion are one and the same thing, which has two several names, because of the two several subjects whereunto they may relate.\(^5\)

And he adds: “we ought to conceive that what in that is a passion, is commonly in this an action”.\(^6\) By this Descartes seems to side somehow with Aristotle whose examples show that action is inseparable from passion: “cuts” is the same operation as “is cut” and “burns” as “is burnt”.

Passions, we are told by Descartes, are one of two genera of the class of thoughts, the second being actions. The latter genus is identified with will, the former with receptions or representations:

[...] our thoughts, which are chiefly of two kinds, to wit, some actions of the soul, others, her passions. Those which I call her actions are all our wills because we experimentally find they come directly from our soul and seem to depend on nought but it. As on the contrary, one may generally call her passions all those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us because oftimes our soul does not make them such as they are to us, and she always receives things as they are represented to her by them.\(^7\)

Identifying the passions of the soul with her receptions Descartes, in this point, takes Aquinas’ side for whom too passion means reception. However, we are not told explicitly whether passions are passive or active, since Descartes doesn’t use these categories in his essay.\(^8\) Presumably, passions are passive because they are defined more precisely as “apprehension, resentments, or emotions of the soul, attributed particularly to it, and caused, fomented, and fortified by some motion of the spirits.”\(^9\) What we are told is that he values action more than passion.\(^10\) This can be reckoned as the common point to Descartes and to Aquinas.

5. Let my third element of the picture be Spinoza who provides us with the distinction between passivity and activity in terms of their definitions. In the third part of his *Ethics*, *The Origin and Nature of the Affects*,\(^11\) he gives the second definition as follows:
I say that we ‘act’ when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause – that is (by D1 [D1: I call a cause ‘adequate’ if its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. I call it ‘partial’ or ‘inadequate’ if its effect cannot be understood through it alone.]), when something happens that follows from our nature, and can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are ‘acted on’ when something happens in us ... of which we are only a partial cause.12

In the third definition Spinoza makes it clear that: “By ‘affect’ I understand •states of a body by which its power of acting is increased or lessened, helped or hindered, and also •the ideas of these states.” And Spinoza ends: “Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these states, the affect in question is what I call an ‘action’; otherwise it is a ‘passion’.”13 Thereby, we see that all affects are divided into two classes: actions and passions. The parallel is maintained: “A mind’s actions arise from adequate ideas alone; its passions depend on inadequate ideas alone.”14 Therefore, the affects of the soul are either actions or passions, they are either autonomous or dependent.

The general scheme is, as it were, similar to some extent to that in Descartes. In Descartes thoughts are divided into actions, that is will, and passions, that is receptions. In Spinoza affects are divided into actions and passions. The criterion of distinction of activity and passivity is similar. In Descartes as well as in Spinoza this is the nature of cause: by defining an adequate cause as that of which “its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it”, Spinoza seems to follow Descartes for whom “actions are all our wills because we experimentally find they come directly from our soul and seem to depend on nought but it”.15 The difference (apart from vocabulary – here thoughts, there affects) is the fact that Spinoza’s affects relate to the body, while Descartes’ thoughts relate to the soul.

However, when Spinoza comes to the definitions of joy and of sorrow, the matter becomes a little blurred, because they are both said to be affects,16 but in the following sentences Spinoza speaks about them as passions.17 It does mean that on one occasion he uses a broader class-term and on another occasion a narrower generic term. We could infer that joy and sorrow may be passions as well as actions, given that affect is more general than passion in the sense that affects include both passions and actions. Spinoza refers to this point in Prop. LVIII, where he claims: “Apart from the pleasure and the desire that are passions, there are other affects of pleasure and desire that we have because we act”.18 Obviously, sorrow is not mentioned here, but, in the next proposition, he says: “All the affects are related to desire, pleasure, or unpleasure [i.e. sorrow]”.19 So far, we can only surmise that he uses a category of affect in two senses: in relation to desire and pleasure in its broader sense (meaning action as well as passion) and in relation to unpleasure in its narrower sense (meaning passion only). The confusion can be all the greater especially because, as we have seen, at one time Spinoza speaks about affects of pleasure and desire, while at another time about affects of pleasure and unpleasure.

This point is illuminated in the same proposition in the following sentences: “But by ‘unpleasure’ we understand a lessening or hindering of a mind’s power of acting [...] So to the extent that a mind has unpleasure its power of understanding [...] is lessened or hindered. So no affects of unpleasure can be related to a mind because of its activity: only affects of pleasure and desire can do that [...].”20 Are we to say now,
that a lessening of the mind’s power has an inadequate, that is, dependent cause, while an adequate cause produces only an increase in mental power?

It is true that already earlier, in Prop. XI, Spinoza specified that unpleasure (i.e. sorrow) is “the passion by which a mind passes to a lesser perfection”, but there was no mention of any relation between a passage to a greater versus lesser perfection and action versus passion. Quite the opposite: in the Def. III (see above) Spinoza made a distinction between actions-affects and passions-affects by means of adequate and inadequate cause of these states of body, regardless of whether “its power of acting is increased or lessened, helped or hindered”. It is only now, that is not before Prop. LIX, that we see that actions-affects are related to increasing or helping mental power and that lessening or hindering man’s power corresponds to passions-affects.

In a way, we meet here a similar confusion to that we have seen in Aquinas and the result happens to be similar as well: the major term (passio in sense P2 in Aquinas, affect in Spinoza) is used imprecisely and sorrow is granted a different status from that of joy. On the other hand, we can say that the general approach is similar as well. Spinoza uses a qualification of power as increasing/lessening, while Aquinas employs a qualification of change in melius/in deterius and the distinctive status of sorrow is grasped as follows: “sorrow [tristitia] is more naturally called a passion than is joy” (Aquinas) and: “So no affects of unpleasure [Tristitiæ] can be related to a mind because of its activity: only affects of pleasure and desire can do that [...]” (Spinoza).

6.

So much for Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza. These three examples show that the problem is significant. It is not easy, first, to draw a strict demarcation line between passivity and activity, then, to remain consistent with the demarcation drawn. Besides, we see that the distinctions and stances vary.

From a diachronic standpoint, Descartes’ view on affectivity was analysed by A. O. Rorty (1982, 159–172). In her paper on the “transformations of the passions to emotions and sentiments” and on how “passions became the very activities of the mind, its own motions” (Rorty 1982, 159), she “trace[d] the ways in which their [i.e. Descartes’ and Hume’s] attempts to explain the phenomena of the passions lead them to revise their initial accounts of the mind and its powers” (Rorty 1982, 161). One can hope that her forthcoming book will extend the perspective taken into account up to the 20th century and will say more on the activity and passivity of affectivity.

A more developed analysis was presented by James, whom I have already referred to in my Notes. She, too, confined herself to 17th century philosophy taking into account Descartes and Malebranche, Hobbes and Spinoza, and, to a lesser extent, Pascal and Locke. In Part I she deals with Aristotle and Aquinas, but I found no general conclusion in her book pertaining to the active/passive nature of affectivity. James, probably, would maintain that it can be both, as it results from a distinction she makes en passant in her Introduction (1997, 11): “[t]he passivity of passions and the stirrings of perturbations [...] the one at rest, the other in motion; the one inactive, the other driving”. The implication she points to can be taken as a kind of conclusion, that during the seventeenth century: “the categories of activity and passivity have no place in discussions of the philosophy of mind and action, and should be replaced by talk of causes and effects” (James 1997, 290).

Another book by Dixon, whose title echoes, albeit in a truncated version, A. O. Rorty’s formula, is about “when and why did English-language psychological writers stop using ‘passions’, ‘affections’ and ‘sentiments’ as their primary categories and
start referring instead to the ‘emotions’?” (Dixon 2003, 4). In a way Dixon’s book is orthogonal to James’: on the one hand it considers a longer time span and, a fortiori, more authors, on the other it is limited to English-language authors (apart from a chapter on Augustine and Aquinas plus a series of remarks on Aristotle and Descartes). In order to reply to the question he asked, Dixon points to Thomas Brown, in his opinion “the inventor of the emotions” (2003, 109). He doesn’t deal particularly with the activity and passivity of affectivity. However, in the final section of the conclusions, titled “From passions and affections to emotions” he observes that “[in the t]raditional Christian view [...] ‘[p]assions’ and ‘affections’ were amongst the most important categories of active powers of the soul [...] [in] Brown, Spencer and Bain [...] ‘[e]motions’, from the outset, were involuntary: they were mini-agents in their own right, rather than movements or actions of a will or self” (2003, 250–251).

7. Now, let it be just remembered that affectus and passio were used commonly as philosophical terms for Latin translations of the Greek term pathos. In this respect the most explicit evidence is perhaps the passage in Saint Augustine’s City of God, Book IX: “[...] the mental emotional, which the Greeks call pathê, while certain of our fellow countrymen, like Cicero, describe them as disturbances, others as affections or affects, and others again, like Apuleius, as passions, which renders the Greek word more explicitly.”25 As a matter of fact, in the Stoics pathos is a general term used to refer to affectivity,” e.g. “Passion, or emotion is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess. The main, or most universal, emotions [...] constitute four great classes, grief, fear or craving, pleasure. They hold emotions to be judgments [...]”27

If we shift to Aristotle, we realize that pathos encompasses passive as well as active affectivity, as it can be inferred, for example, from the fact that one form of pathe is friendship: “By the feelings, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain.”28 Friendship must be an active feeling, because, as Aristotle says himself: “it is those who wish the good of their friends for their friends’ sake who are friends in the fullest sense, since they love each other for themselves and not accidentally.”29

And what before Aristotle? If we move back to Plato, the Presocratics and Homer, we will discover another term which was used as a general category for speaking about affectivity. This term is thumos. However, it occurs that in thumos a stress is put on the active side of affectivity. For example in Parmenides thumos is what leads him in his philosophical investigation: “the mares carry me as far as my thumos [feeling] reaches.”30 Hence, thumos is, using Spinoza’s expression, its adequate cause, because “its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it”. Plato too is very keen on underlining the active side of affectivity and he goes so far as to remind the reader of the etymology of the word:31 “And θυμός has its name from the raging (θύμησις) and boiling of the soul.”32

In Greek philosophy we have, therefore, two terms, centred on two complementary features of affectivity: its passivity expressed in pathos and its activity expressed in thumos. I refer to just two further pieces of evidence.33 The first is a saying of Heraclitus: “It is hard to fight against thumos; for whatever it wants, it buys at the cost of the soul.”34 The second one comes from Plato: “For this feeling of
wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy [...]).

It is manifest that in the first passage we deal with activity (thumos) for the sole reason that thumos is the subject of two verbs that are active, in form as well as in sense, and it is the object against which one can try to fight. In the second, we are concerned with passivity (pathos) because the sentence is the reply to Theaetetus’ confession: “By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.” Thus he is speaking about his passive state. Thumos is within me and produces an effect within me, while pathos is an effect within me produced from the outside. That is why, if we follow Spinoza’s distinction between action and passion – “if we can be the adequate cause of any of these states, the affect in question is what I call an ‘action’; otherwise it is a ‘passion’” – thumos can be reckoned as an active affect, while pathos as a passive one.

Historically, however, there is something strange here. In fact, thumos and pathos were hardly synchronic terms. On the one hand, in the Stoics and Aristotle there is pathos, but no thumos in the sense of emotion/feeling; on the other hand, in Homer and the Presocratics there is thumos, but no pathos (with one exception). The boundary line between the two is Plato: in his works we find thumos as well as pathos. And it could only be wondered to what extent the understanding of both words was influenced by their etymologies and whether it is a mere coincidence that they reflect in the sense that pathos expresses rather passivity, while thumos expresses rather activity.

8.

Now, if we reconstruct a diachronic perspective of historical preferences for this or that term, the result turns out to be the following:

1st stage – thumos / no pathos
2nd stage – thumos / pathos
3rd stage – pathos, passio, passion, affectus

Nevertheless, the 4th stage has to be outlined. Nowadays the prevailing term for speaking about affectivity is emotion. Although it started being widely used in the 19th century by Thomas Brown (1822), John Stuart Mill (1843), Alexander Bain (1859), Charles Darwin (1872), and William James (1884), this term is attested already, for example, in Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul. Yet, let me adduce a 20th century monograph, J.-P. Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (1939), mainly because Sartre explicitly distinguishes passive and active emotions. For example he writes about “passive enjoyment” and “various activities expressive of joy”, “[in] passive fear [...] my legs give way under me, my heart beats more feebly, I turn pale, fall down and faint away” and: “Flight, in active fear, is mistakenly supposed to be rational behaviour”, “Passive sadness is characterized, as we know, by dejected behaviour [...]” and, finally: “Active sadness can take many forms [...]”.

As it seems, for Sartre passivity is a state of inert activity. However, in some way, Sartrian activity and passivity do not mean properly active and passive states. If we look closer at the context, it becomes clear that Sartre associates them, respectively, with movement towards and movement away from. For this reason
Sartrian concepts of activity and passivity within affectivity can be brought near to von Monakow & Mourgue’s concepts of klisis and ekklisis, which are based on the criteria of pursuit and avoidance, attraction and repulsion. But this is not to say that pursuing is more active than avoiding. Moreover, it should be mentioned that von Monakow & Mourgue’s distinction was known to the ancient Greeks. The earliest evidence I know can be found in a fragment of Democritus’ pupil Diotimus. According to Diotimus, Democritus recognized three criteria, one of which relates to “feeling for choice and avoidance; for what we feel attracted to, as belonging to us, that is to be chosen, and what we feel alienated from, that is to be avoided”.

Are _thumos_, _pathos_, _passio_, passion, _affectus_, emotion all general categories involved in discussion about the active/passive nature of affectivity and in discussion about affectivity in general? Not yet. A 5th stage, which originates at least as long ago as with Auguste Comte and J. S. Mill, should be added. Comte used a term _sentiment_ and Mill employed _feeling_ as a central category for affectivity. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries this term came to be a central one for Théodule A. Ribot within his, first, _Psychologie des sentiments_ (1896), then _Logique des sentiments_ (1905), two titles which rapidly became prototypical.

In _Psychologie des sentiments_ Ribot distinguished active as well as passive affective phenomena. For example he speaks about “passive and active pains”. Although he doesn’t provide an explicit explanation of this distinction we could infer what the difference is from a series of passages: active is seen as outgoing, while passive is seen as introverted, e.g. “The motor functions translate pain in two opposite ways: the passive form of depression, arrest, or total suppression of movements, in which the patient seems overcome; the active form, marked by agitation, contortions, convulsions, and cries.” In other words, active is what has a strong and visible manifestation, while passive is what is silent and retiring, or, to use Ribot’s wording, “the passive, or apathetic […] the active, or impulsive”. Finally, passive is glossed by receptive and active by motor. To be frank, it looks close to Sartre’s perspective, who, if I am not mistaken, does not refer to Ribot in his _Esquisse_. For my purpose it is significant that for both Ribot and Sartre affectivity cannot be considered in its whole either as exclusively passive or as exclusively active because it includes active as well as passive phenomena.

The word corresponding to _feeling_ in German is _Gefühl_. I do not mean that the semantic field of _Gefühl_ overlaps exactly the semantic field of _feeling_. Surely, this is not the case. What is important is that _feeling_ occurs as the standard translation of _Gefühl_, albeit in philosophical rather than psychological texts, one might add. Probably for this reason the issue was addressed by C. G. Jung (1977, 30): “German psychologists have already recommended the suppression of the word _Empfindung_ for feeling, and propose that one should use the word _Gefühl_ (feeling) for values, while the word _Empfindung_ should be used for sensation.”

If so – I mean, if philosophers make a clear distinction between feeling/_Gefühl_ and emotion/_Regung_ and between feeling/_Gefühl_ and sensation/_Empfindung_, they have to have good reasons for it. I would wonder whether this is not so because, on the one hand, _feeling_ (or _Gefühl_) seems to be free of historical burdens and as such is neutral, at any rate more neutral than _emotion_ and, on the other hand, it encompasses affectivity thoroughly in its entirety. It has seemed appropriate as a general category to philosophers treating affectivity who adopted a stratifying approach and discriminated
different layers of affective phenomena in order to include affectivity in ontology and ethics.

According to Scheler’s classification there are four strata of feelings: “(1) **sensible feelings**, or “feelings of sensation” [...], (2) **feelings of the lived body** (as states) and **feelings of life** (as functions), (3) **pure psychic feelings** (pure feelings of the ego), and (4) **spiritual feelings** (feelings of the personality)”\(^6\). Using the criteria of these distinctions, one could claim that **sensible feelings** are purely passive, **feelings of the lived body** (as states) are mostly but not only passive, **pure psychic feelings** are mostly but not only active, while **spiritual feelings** are purely active.

Scheler does not apply the categories of passivity and activity in setting out this classification. However, it seems to me that my interpretation can be based on the following:

A sensible feeling is given essentially as a **state**, never as a function or an act. [...] Whereas sensible feelings are more or less **dead states**, a vital feeling always has a **functional** and **intentional** character. [...] In a vital feeling [...] something is given to us in this feeling. [...] A psychic feeling [...] is **originaliter** an ego–quality. [...] there can be various distances from the ego. **Increasing** proximity to the ego is expressed, e.g., by “I feel sad,” “I feel sadness,” I am sad” (the first of these probably lies at the limits of what can be expressed in language). [...] **Spiritual feelings** are distinguished from purely psychic feelings, as it appears to me, first by the fact that they can **never** be **states**. [...] these feelings are not conditioned by value–exterior to the person [...] are the only ones which cannot be conceived as feelings that could be produced, or even **merited**, by our comportment [...].\(^6\)

Moreover, on another occasion Scheler is explicit that the boundaries between passivity and activity are not rigid: “Here too there seems to be a smooth and continuous development among the various experiential factors, active and passive [...]”.\(^6\)

Hartmann distinguished three groups of emotional acts: (i) emotional and receptive, then (ii) emotional and prospective acts, finally (iii) emotional and spontaneous acts. The first group relates to the present moment: to experience (e.g. hostility or respect), to live through, to endure (for example, when I am physically attacked). The second points to the future: to expect, to foresee, to forebode, to be anxious, to hope, to desire. The last one includes acts that are centred on the future, but rather active than receptive, as it appears to me, first by the fact that they can **never** be **states**. [...] these feelings are not conditioned by value–exterior to the person [...] are the only ones which cannot be conceived as feelings that could be produced, or even **merited**, by our comportment [...].\(^6\)

For the present let me refer briefly to three authors directly tackling the topic in recent times, the first of them being R. S. Peters (1961–1962, 116–134). According to Peters (1961–1962, 120), on the one hand “we make reference to [...] fear, anger, and jealousy [...] either as reasons for action or [...] as motives for acting. We act **out of** fear, jealousy, anger, etc.” However, on the other hand, “we are sometimes overcome by fear, jealousy, anger, etc.” In this case, he says, “we are speaking of them as emotions”. Peters concludes (1961–1962, 121): “We naturally use the term ‘emotion’
and its derivatives to pick out our passivity.” For him it is not only a question of using the term. Emotions are dependent on our “autonomic nervous system” (Peters 1961–1962, 121) and consequently even if we describe them as actions they are passive as long as they can be explained in terms of being subject to something.

In his reply to Peters, C. A. Mace (1961–1962, 141) points out that the “emotional states are complex upheavals involving elements of passivity and elements of activity”. Indeed, it is surprising that Peters, after himself giving examples of active emotions, denies the active character of emotions, and insists on a thesis reducing all affective phenomena to only one type of them.70

The third author who discusses directly the issue of the passivity of emotions is R. M. Gordon (1986, 371–392). According to him (Gordon 1986, 372) “the attack on the passivity of emotions trades on a common misconception of what the passivity consists in: of what it is for something to be a passion”. His main thesis is that

although emotions and actions are each causally dependent on both cognitive and attitudinal states, there is a systematic difference in the contents of these states [...] when one acts for a reason one’s action is caused by attitudes and beliefs that are related in the following way: given the attitude, what is believed (the content of the belief) “says something in favor of,” or “argues for” so acting. On the other hand, the attitudes and beliefs that underlie, say embarrassment, are not so related: it is not true that, given the attitude, what is believed “says something in favor of,” “argues for” being embarrassed [...] (Gordon 1986, 386–387).

My impression is that Gordon is wrong as far as he relies on a particular grammatical point. In fact, he takes into consideration examples of such verbs that are related to emotions only in their passive forms, and do not have this meaning in their active form. He confines himself to the following causative (or factitive) verbs: amused (from amuse), annoyed (from annoy), astonished (astonish) and so on (his other examples are similar: troubled, upset, vexed) (see Gordon 1986, 373–374). Each of 17 quoted participles comes from a causative verb. For this reason, his argument is one-sided. Why does he not refer to verbs connoting emotion in the active as well as in the passive voice? In what follows in his paper, he doesn’t take account of them at all and limits his discussion by a grammatical distinction that is inaccurate for the issue.

Actually, it is so easy to ask: what about verbs that denote emotion in the active voice? And it is so easy to find them. Examples are love, admire, or – as in Plato’s Phaedrus, where the same verb is used in both the active and the passive – ποθεῖ ταῖς ποθεῖ ταῖς. Here it is patent that such cases don’t correspond to Gordon’s description and falsify his thesis about the passive nature of emotions.73

11.

For my part, given that I have begun with the ancient Greeks and gone on up to Sartre and to Hartmann, I would like to settle on the following formula based on A. O. Rorty’s: “from thumos to pathos and affectus, then from passion to emotion and feeling”. I think that it adequately outlines the dynamics of transformation in the history of the concept of affectivity in European philosophy. There is no room, unfortunately, to address the issue, but I would assume that if Dixon is right in stating that “a transition from ‘passions and affection’ to ‘emotions’” (2003, 250) is “a story
of secularisation” (2003, 21), then one could ask whether a transition “from thumos to pathe and to passion and affection” is not, inversely, “a story of sacralization”.

As to the passivity and activity of affectivity, we see that the quarrel involves above all those who claim that all emotions are either exclusively passive or exclusively active. The problem, therefore, must be that: “[...] it seems likely that each of these great men will have seen some important aspect of the subject, and that the mistake of each will have been to emphasize this aspect to the exclusion of others which are equally relevant.” (Broad 1930, 1). In what concerns the realm of affectivity a reductionist approach is extremely serious, as affectivity is a particularly complex and rich field.

This feature is often grasped by scholars but appropriate solutions are proposed much more infrequently. As stated by Dixon: “While physicalist definitions reduced everything downwards (to animal passions and physiology), anti-physicalist ones reduced upwards (to mind and cognition)” (2003, 195). Accordingly, “[a] corollary of this is that we need more than one theory, and more than one category, to do justice to the phenomena we are seeking to include in the category ‘emotions’.” (2003, 245). Similarly G. E. R. Lloyd, being aware of “the multidimensionality of the phenomena”, assumes that “there is no single discourse that should have precedence over all others” (2007, 84).

Such solutions are, in my opinion, too pessimistic. For there is a need to find a common denominator for all that is included in the realm of affectivity, if the category of affectivity is to be maintained as valid and if we wish to embrace the whole of affectivity effectively. Here, too, i.e. as to passivity versus activity of affectivity, the same happens and my suggestion would be that in reality some affective phenomena are passive or predominantly passive, while others are active (or predominantly active). Denying this, we risk “fly[ing] in the face of the universal human experience” (Roberts, 1988, 192). To add just one more historical classification, let me quote T. Czeżowski (1989, 215–216), who, following Brentano’s standpoint, divided all affective phenomena into two classes: active, e.g. feelings of values, and passive, e.g. aesthetic feelings.

However, it is not simple to build one such theory and such a single discourse, because, first, “[t]he contrast between voluntary actions and involuntary passions is generally too sharply drawn” (Rorty 1978, 139) and, secondly, the “distinctions between being active and being passive” are what “we have inherited” (Rorty 1978, 141).

As an answer to the question whether affectivity is passive or active, my general conclusion would be this: feelings are such complex phenomena that it is hard to ascribe to them the single feature either of activity or of passivity. They are passive as well as active – it depends on the level that is taken into consideration. If we look closer, several philosophers recognize, albeit not always overtly, that we have to deal with different levels of affectivity. In order to capture them a vertical approach is without any doubt more useful than a horizontal one. It enhances our understanding of different kinds of items of the same class, as in the case of lower and higher affectivity. Through a multilevel approach it is easier to acknowledge that the basic levels of affective phenomena are passive, while the higher levels are active. Or even better: that the basic level is purely passive, the highest one is purely active and that between them we have a gradation of lessening passivity versus increasing activity.

I have been led to the multilevel perspective of Scheler and the multidimensionality of affectivity in Hartmann. More recently, the claim that
Affective phenomena are heterogeneous as to their passivity and activity has been supported by R. C. Roberts who stresses the fact of the “odd mixture of passivity and activity so characteristic of our experience of emotions” (1988, 193).

A word about the limits of my presentation. I am unable to discuss here the consequences of seeing the whole of affectivity either as predominantly or exclusively passive or as predominantly or exclusively active for an understanding of what affectivity is. Neither do I have any idea whether these tendencies correspond – either as causes or effects – to the cultural interpretation of affectivity either as negative or as positive, or to a preference for this or that term. It could be that there is a mere coincidence. However it can be conjectured that some relations exist and several habits can have their impact as well. Last but not least, the current strong tendency to use the term emotion carries us round in a circle, taking us back, as it were, to the earliest term, thumos. If my suggestion expressed in the formula “from thumos to pathos and affectus, then from passion to emotion and feeling” is apt, it could constitute one more element for discarding prejudices about the character of affective phenomena taken in their entirety and for enhancing the understanding of their true nature.

Notes

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1 See also vol. 19, xxiii and v. 20, 18: “[...] the term emotion and its derivates [are used to] pick out the fact of the person’s passivity [...]”. However, D’Arcy says, “there are two points which seem to me to tell decisively against ‘passion’ and in favour of ‘emotion’. First, in modern English, the term ‘passion’ is used only of visitations that are vehement, even violent [...] The second point is, I think, conclusive. St Thomas holds that there are eleven species of passiones animæ: love and hatred, desire and aversion, pleasure and sorrow, hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger [...] Now, the term ‘emotion’ can be applied to each of these fairly naturally, whether vehemently felt or not [...]”.


Robert Zaborowski


5 Transl. anon. (1650) with minor corrections by P. Easton. Descartes, *Les passions de l’âme*, Art. 1: “[...] tout ce qui se fait ou qui arrive de nouveau est généralement appelé par les philosophes une passion au regard du sujet auquel il arrive, et une action au regard de celui qui fait qu’il arrive. En sorte que, bien que l’agent et le patient soient souvent fort différents, l’action et la passion ne laissent pas d’être toujours une même chose qui a ces deux noms, à raison des deux divers sujets auxquels on la peut rapporter.”

6 Transl. anon. (1650) with minor corrections by P. Easton. Descartes, *Les passions de l’âme*, Art. 2: “nous devons penser que ce qui est en elle une passion est communément en lui une action [...]”.

7 Transl. anon. (1650) with minor corrections by P. Easton. Descartes, *Les passions de l’âme*, Art. 17: “nos pensées, lesquelles sont principalement de deux genres, à savoir: les unes sont les actions de l’âme, les autres sont ses passions. Celles que je nomme ses actions sont toutes nos volontés, à cause que nous expérimenpons qu’elles viennent directement de notre âme, et semblent ne dépendre que d’elle. Comme, au contraire, on peut généralement nommer ses passions toutes les sortes de perceptions ou connaissances qui se trouvent en nous, à cause que souvent ce n’est pas notre âme qui les fait telles qu’elles sont, et que toujours elle les reçoit des choses qui sont représentées par elles.”

8 See James (1997, 96): “Yet, taken as a whole, the definition [in Descartes] presents the passions as lying between two categories, sharing some of the features of each without answering completely to either. Once we take account of their phenomenological as well as causal character, the passions, like nomads, traverse the border between perceptions and volitions, between passions and actions of the soul, between states that are, and are not, directly dependent on the body.” In similar vein James (1997, 117) concludes as to Malebranche: “By interpreting passions as the effects of volitions, Malebranche combines in them elements of both activity and passivity. In so far as they are sensations, they carry connotations of passivity; but in so far as they are the motions of the will they are actions [...]”.

See Art. 19, transl. anon. (1650) with minor corrections by P. Easton: “[...] the denomination comes still from that which is most noble: therefore it is not customary to call it a passion, but only an action.” Descartes, Les passions de l’âme, Art. 19: “la dénomination se fait toujours par ce qui est le plus noble, et ainsi on n’a point coutume de la nommer une passion, mais seulement une action.”

Please note that he uses *affectus* and not *passio* as Aquinas and Descartes and some sixty years later on David Hume.

Transl. J. F. Bennett. Spinoza, *Ethica. Pars tertia: De origine & natura affectuum*, Def. II. “Nos tum agere dico, cum aliquid in nobis, aut extra nos fit, cujus adequata sumus causa, hoc est (per Defin. preced. [I. *Causam adequatam* appello eam, cujus effectus potest clare, & distincte per eandem percipi. *Inadæquatam* autem, seu *partialæ* illum voco, cujus effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit,]) cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis, aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare, & distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit, vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cujus nos non, nisi partialis, sumus causa.”

Transl. J. F. Bennett. Spinoza, *Ethica. Pars tertia: De origine & natura affectuum*, Def. III. “Per *Affectum* intelligo Corporis affectiones, quibus ipsius Corporis agendi potentia augeatur, vel minuitur, juvat, vel coercetur, & simul harum affectionum ideas. Si itaque alicujus harum affectionum adequata possimus esse causa, tum per Affectum *actionem* intelligo, alias *passionem.*”

“Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adequatis oriuntur; passiones autem a solis inadæquatis pendent.”

And the same is valid for Spinoza’s “we are ‘acted on’ when something happens in us ... of which we are only partial cause” versus Descartes’ “passions [called] those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us because oftimes our soul does not make them such as they are to us”.


potentia minuit, vel coercet [...] adeoque Mens, quatenus contristatur, eatenus ejus intelligendi [...] minuitur, vel coercetur; adeoque nulli Tristitiae affectus ad Mentem referri possunt, quatenus agit; sed tantum affectus Lætitiae, & Cupiditatis, qui (per Prop. præced.) eatenus etiam ad Mentem referuntur.”

21 According to James (1997), 151 “By abandoning the distinction between active volition and passive perceptions, he [Spinoza] gets rid of one influential way of discriminating passivity from activity in favour of the view that all thoughts are caused and can be causes”.

22 And other philosophers could be taken into account. See Rorty (1982), James (1997), Dixon (2003). Kassler (1998), 162 refers to Thomas Willis and quotes: “Willis 1664/1681, p. 95: ‘But there happen to this [corporeal soul], because it is apt to be moved with a various impulse, and so to contract or dilate its species [emanations] in whole, or in part, for that reason divers manners both of Actions and of Passions, to wit, the Senses, which we call its Passions; and Motions, which we name the Actions of the same’.”

23 Rorty (1982, 160) advances an interesting and important observation that “when the passions have become acts and activities of the mind, then reason, imagination, perception and desire have also been relocated”.

24 See http://amelierorty.blogspot.com/2008/03/amelie-oksenberg-rorty.html: “From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments (Oxford University Press) (All the chapters of this book are written; they only need revision).”


26 See Frede (1986), 97: “[...] in this tradition, it seems, this very word ‘pathos’ or ‘affection’ is taken to indicate that the irrational motions of the soul quite generally, not just those which are irrational in the narrower sense, are a thing which we suffer, which comes over us without our active participation, which is not directly in our control, which is not something we can make up our mind to have or not to have, as we please. It is for this reason that in this tradition the term ‘pathos’ takes on the connotation of ‘passio’, ‘affect’, ‘purely passive affection’.”


From Thumos to Emotion and Feeling

Parmenides DK 28 B 1, 1: ἵππω ὑπὲ τις ἐπί θυμός ἰκάνοι. It is translated also by: “heart” (Burnet, Kirk – Raven, Tarán, Austin, Henn, White), “desire” (Freeman, Hussey, O’Brien), “impulse” (Gallop), “spirit” (Coxon), “will” (Cordero).

This etymology has been rejected by H. Frisk (1960) and accepted by Liddell, Scott & Jones (1940) and P. Chantraine (1968).


For Homer see e.g. Zielinski (2002) and Clarke (1999), esp. 61: “θυμός and its family”, labelled also “‘the θυμός family’”.

Heraclitus DK 22 B 85: θυμόι μόχεσθαι χαλεπῶν ὡ γάρ ἐν θέλη, ψυχῆς ὅνειται. Thumos has been rendered by: “one’s heart’s desire” (Burnet), “passion” (English), “impulse” (Freeman), “[virtuous] anger [or emotion]” (Kirk – Raven), “impulsive desire” (Wheelwright), “desire” (Guthrie), “passion” (North), “heart’s desire […] ‘hearts as the center of emotion and passion […] its precise meaning seems to be ‘heart as the center of desire’” (Marcovich), “passion in a more general sense” (Nussbaum), “passion” (Kahn), “desire” (Robb), “passion (<one’s> heart)” (Robinson). For a fuller discussion of the fragment see Zaborowski (2003).

Transl. H. N. Fowler. Plato, Theaetetus 155 d 2–4: μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θευματίζειν· οὔ γὰρ ἄλλη ἄρχη φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτή [...]. See also J. Mc Dowell’s translation: “Because that experience, the feeling of wonder, is very characteristic of a philosopher: philosophy has no other starting-point.”


The exact sense of the Greek verb σκοτοδινιῶ is: “suffer from dizziness or vertigo” (Liddell, Scott & Jones 1940). Its subject is Theaetetus himself, not his head. See M. J. Levet’s translation: “I begin to feel quite giddy”.

See e.g. G. Striker (1996) 289: “Since thumos as a synonym of orgē is normally used by Aristotle in a narrower sense than in Plato [...].”

E. g. T. Brown (1822), 14: “But though our intellectual analysis were perfect, so that we could distinguish, in our most complex thought or emotion, its constituent elements, and trace with exactness the series of simpler thoughts which have progressively given rise to them, other inquiries, equally, or still more important would remain.”, though he uses feeling as well, see e.g. Lecture IV: “Relation of the Philosophy of Mind to the Cultivation of Moral Feeling”.

E. g. J. S. Mill (1843), 72: “Of the first leading division of nameable things, viz., Feelings or States of Consciousness, we began by recognizing three sub-divisions; Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions.”

A. Bain (1859), Emotions and the Will (London: John W. Parker).

C. Darwin (1872), The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray).

E.g. in the definition of the passions of the soul in Art. 27 (see also Art. 28 & Art. 29), but also in *Principles of Philosophy* I, 48, transl. J. F. Bennett: “emotions or passions of the mind that don’t consist of thought alone, such as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness and love [...]”. See also Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* I, 48: “itemque, commotiones, sive animi pathemata, quae non in solo cogitatione consistunt, ut commotio ad iram, ad hilaritatem, ad tristiam, ad amorem [...]” and Descartes, *Les principes de la philosophie* I, 48: “les émotions ou les passions de l’âme, qui ne dépendent pas de la pensée seule, comme l’émotion à la colère, à la joye, à la tristesse, à l’amour”.

It is interesting to quote Sartre here also because his project is to “study emotion as a purely transcendental phenomenon, not considering particular emotions, but seeking to attain and elucidate the transcendent essence of emotion [...]” (1971), 23 (Sartre 1939, 8: “étudiera l’émotion comme phénomène transcendental pur et cela, non pas en s’adressant à des émotions particulières, mais en cherchant à atteindre et à élucider l’essence transcendante de l’émotion [...]”), “to indicate the limitations of such a psychological investigation” (1971), 92–93 (Sartre 1939, 51: “marquer les limites de cette recherche psychologique”) and, later on, to “lead, in particular, to the initiation of complete monographic studies of joy, sadness, etc. Here we have furnished only the schematic directions of such monographs. [...]” (1971), 92, n. 1 (Sartre 1939, 51, n. 1: “amorcer des études monographiques complètes de la joie, de la tristesse, etc. Nous n’avons fourni, ici, que les directions schématiques de semblables monographies.”).

Sartre (1971), 32. Sartre (1939), 17: “joie passive”.


Sartre (1971), 66. Sartre (1939), 35: “la peur passive [...] mes jambes se dérobent sous moi, mon cœur bat plus faiblement, je pâlis, je tombe et je m’évanouis”.


Sartre (1971), 68. Sartre (1939), 36: “La tristesse passive est caractérisée, on le sait, par une conduite d’accablement [...]”.


Sartre (1971), 85: “[i]t is an inert activity, a consciousness rendered passive”. Sartre (1939), 46: “C’est une activité inerte, une conscience passivisée.”

See C. von Monakow & R. Mourgue (1928), 8: “C’est pourquoi des expressions tirées du grec comme *klisis* (pour désigner la tendance finaliste et créatrice dans le sens de l’union vers un être ou une chose) et *ekklisis* (pour désigner le phénomène contraire) paraissent beaucoup plus maniables sans inconvenient que les expressions tirées du langage de la vie de tous les jours, qui se rapportent, toujours et nécessairement, à un stade très évolué du développement.”
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54 Transl. C. C. W. Taylor. Diotimus DK 76, 3 = Democritus DK 68 A 111: Διότιμος δὲ τρία καὶ αὐτὸν [Demokr.] ἔλεγεν εἶναι κριτήρια [...] 3) αἰρέσεως δὲ καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὁ προσοικειούμεθα, τούτῳ αἱρέτων ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ οἱ προσαλλοτριούμεθα, τούτῳ φευκτόν ἐστιν. The significance of τὰ πάθη (feelings) is to be noted. So does W. K. C. Guthrie (1965), 493: “The feelings, it is true, have their usefulness, for if the obscure Diotimus is to be trusted here, we should let them be our guide in what is to be sought and what avoided [...]

55 E.g. A. Comte (1852), 238: “[...] la théorie positive de la logique humaine, fondée sur l’emploi combiné des sentiments, des images, et des signes [...] la logique des sentiments, la logique des images et la logique des signes.”, and, first of all (1852, 239): “On doit regarder comme plus sûre qu’aucune autre la logique des sentiments [...]”. It is plausible that he uses feeling and emotion synonymously as it results from the expression on the same page “la logique des émotions”. See also A. Comte (1856), 27–28: “Alors on est finalement conduit à définir la logique: Le concours normal des sentiments, des images, et des signes, pour nous inspirer les conceptions qui conviennent à nos besoins, moraux, intellectuels, et physiques. [...] A la tête des moyens logiques, il faut donc placer les sentiments [...]”.

56 E.g. J. S. Mill (1843), 65: “A Feeling and a State of Consciousness are, in the language of philosophy, equivalent expressions: everything is Feeling, of which the mind is conscious: everything which it feels, or, in other words, which forms a part of its own sentient existence. [...] Feeling, in the proper sense of the term, is a genus, of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought, are subordinate species.” It is worth noting that the way Mill uses feeling resembles Descrates’s use of cogito. See Hoag (1992), 251, n. 22: “Mill’s use of ‘feeling’ parallels Descartes’s introduction of cogito (think) as a technical term to designate diverse sorts of mental states: doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, imagining, desiring, and sensory perceptions. Meditations on First Philosophy [...]”.

57 Translated the following year into English as Psychology of the Emotions and in 1903 into German as Psychologie des Gefühle.

58 T. Ribot (1897), 70. T. Ribot (1896), 71: “les douleurs passives et les douleurs actives”.


60 T. Ribot (1897), 302. T. Ribot (1896), 295: “passive ou apathiques [...] active ou impulsive”.

61 T. Ribot (1897), 231: “the passive, receptive side [...] active and motor side”. T. Ribot (1896), 228: “le côté passif, réceptif [...] côté actif et moteur”.

62 In order to realize this, please consult the entry for feeling in an English–German dictionary on the one hand and the entry for Gefühl in a German–English dictionary on the other.
For example in English translations of the works of Husserl, Scheler, Hartmann versus the title quoted above of Ribot’s *Psychologie des sentiments*, to mention just this one example. Moreover, several English-speaking philosophers use the term feeling for higher and the highest affective phenomena, e.g. Collingwood (1938), 164: “I shall in this book use the word ‘feeling’ only with references to the psychical level of experience, and not as a synonym for emotion generally.” In Stocker (1983) too feeling is taken in a different than sensual meaning (sensation). Hursthouse (1981), 52 translates *pathé* as feelings consistently since the very first sentence of her paper (“Aristotle says that *ethikê areitê*, excellence of character, is a disposition in virtue of which we are well disposed in respect of feelings (*pathé*”).

A quick look at titles included in existing psychological bibliographies on emotion will demonstrate it sufficiently.

Apart from Husserl’s, Scheler’s or Hartmann’s works, there are others, let’s say, from a different philosophical school. See e.g. G. E. M. Anscombe’s translation of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* 256 & 257 for *Empfindung* as sensation and 243, 283, vi & viii for Gefühl as feeling. The same consistency is found in L. Wittgenstein (1980).


See N. Hartmann (1965⁵), 163 sq.: “emotional–rezeptive Akte”, 173 sq.: “emotional–prospektiven Akte”, 182 sq.: “emotional–spontane Akte”. Unfortunately,
at the moment the English translation of Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie is, as far as I know, unavailable.

70 He modified his stance in Peters (1972), 470: “[...] they [emotions] are terms we employ when we wish to link the same mental acts of appraisal with different forms of behaviour – with actions on the one hand and with a variety of passive phenomena on the other.”

71 See F. Nietzsche (2000), 271, transl. W. Kaufmann: “A soul that knows it is loved but does not itself love betrays its sediment [...]”. F. Nietzsche (1886), § 79: “Eine Seele, die sich geliebt weiss, aber selbst nicht liebt, verräth ihren Bodensatz [...]”.

72 Plato, Phaedrus 255 d 8. I offer different translations, however identical in the detail I am interested in, that is in the precise rendering of active and passive: Jowett (1871): “he longs as he is longed for” / Fowler (1914): “he is filled with yearning such as he inspires” / Hackforth (1952): “he likewise shares his longing and being longed for” / Rowe (1986): “he longs and is longed for” / Nehemas & Woodruff (1995): “he yearns as much as he is yearned for” / Nichols (1998): “he yearns and is yearned for”. There is also the following note by G. J. de Vries (1969), 175: “For juxtaposition of active and passive forms Hertes [...] quotes from [...]” – several instances follow. Only one, Republic 417 b 2, concerns feeling, namely hatred: μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ κἂν μισοῦμενοι (transl. Shorey: “hating and being hated”).

73 Anscombe (1981) is a paper about Brentano’s position. What Anscombe says (106) in respect to passivity versus activity of emotions is: “The states of emotion [...] undoubtedly cause both voluntary and involuntary actions.” Perhaps it could be inferred ex silentio that she claims that they are passive because in a paragraph where she deals with differences between will and emotions, she writes (107): “To will is either (a) to make some decision [...] or (d) to act voluntarily.”

74 He speaks also about “a process of secularisation” (2003, 21 & 233).

75 See e.g. Solomon (1973), 25, 31, 40: “The purpose of this essay is to show that emotions are very much like actions [...] emotions are actions in any such straightforward sense [...] our emotions are in a sense our doing [...] Emotions are judgments and actions, not occurrences or happenings that we suffer.” See also Solomon (1977), 45, 46 & 48: “‘Emotions are judgments.’ [...] the brunt of this theory is the total demolition of the age-old distinctions between emotion and reason, passion and logic [...] Many judgments, for example perceptual judgments, are made without deliberation. (One might call such judgments “spontaneous” as long as “spontaneity” isn’t confused with “passivity”). [...] every emotion is also a system of desires and intentions, hopes and wishes [...]”.

76 See also Hillman (1960), 243: “The great variety of hypotheses has been necessary to shed light on the phenomenon from many sides. They do not annul or disprove each other.” But his way of evading one-sidedness and simplification is to offer an integration (1960, 246 sq.).

77 In a more general way, “[t]he problem is that our theories of the passions – and thus at least some of our experiences of what we call emotional states – are formed from the picturesque ruins of previous views. We are a veritable walking archaeology of abandoned theories [...]” (Rorty 1982, 172).
Spiritual, psychic, bodily and others. In my view we deal here with a serious lack of vocabulary: are internal feelings intellectual? Are intellectual feelings the only internal ones? See e.g. James (1997, 196): “(...) Descartes and Spinoza, each of whom distinguishes passions from internal or intellectual emotions (...) For Spinoza, our inadequate ideas produce passions and our adequate ones intellectual emotions”.


The sixth of his claims (Roberts 1988, 184) is: “The subject of an emotion is both a) sometimes able to exercise voluntary control over it and b) sometimes unable to do so.” I wonder what sometimes refers to: is it the same emotion, or some emotions while not others, or still another solution?

References


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