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EPICURUS’ HEDONAI KATASTEMATIKAI AND KATA KINESIN VERSUS RIBOT’S STATIC AND DYNAMIC PASSIONS∗

To commemorate Théodule Ribot (1839–1916)

Abstract. There is a striking parallel between Epicurus’ distinction of two types of pleasures (fr. 2 Usener = DL 10, 136, 10–12) and Ribot’s distinction of two types of passions (Essai sur les passions, 1907). The paper focuses on possible similarities and dissimilarities of both approaches. Remarkably, Epicurus’ hedone is just one category among pleasant feelings and Ribot’s passions are but one family of the whole class of affectivity. Epicurus’ and Ribot’s distinctions appear to be useful for advancing a theory of affectivity, particularly in integrating various affective phenomena in one model in the form of a hierarchy and pointing to the principle the hierarchy is organized by.

Keywords: Epicurus, Théodule Ribot, affectivity, hedonai katastematikai, hedonai kata kinesin, static passions, dynamic passions, taxonomy of affectivity, hierarchy of affectivity.

1. Foreword

This is another piece of my ancient and modern dossier†. I again shall compare one ancient and one modern philosopher. Epicurus for obvious reasons never heard of Ribot and Ribot knew Epicurus but didn’t draw on his distinction. Therefore it is more appropriate to speak about prefiguration or anticipation, if any similarity between their positions turns out to be found during the analysis below. As I understand it, the purpose of such an approach is not only a historical but also a philosophical one. The latter may be even

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∗ This is an importantly expanded version of what I presented in April 25–29, 2011 in Madrid during Jornadas Epicuro. I thank Prof. José M. Zamora Calvo (UAM) for his invitation as well as two anonymous reviewers for their remarks. I thank also Tiziano Dorandi and Yosef Liebersohn for providing me with elements useful to end this paper which were inaccessible to me at the time of completing it.

more interesting and promising insofar as it contributes to advancing a theory of affectivity because of notions and categories it sheds light on.

The gist of this paper is provoked by a strange coincidence that occurs between Epicurus’ categories of kinetic and katastematic pleasures\(^1\) and Ribot’s distinction between dynamic and static passions. Since pleasures and passions belong to the class of affective phenomena, another element that makes a comparison possible is that Epicurus’ pleasures (hedonai) are only one species within a broader and unnamed, as it seems, genus including eudaimonia and makariotes, and, analogously, Ribot’s passions are only one family within a class of feelings (sentiments). At any rate I wouldn’t like to give the impression that the following discussion of Epicurus and Ribot completely exhausts all possible connections between Epicurus and Ribot\(^2\), Epicurus and the moderns or Ribot and the ancients.

2. Introduction

Let me start with the two following remarks. I don’t wish to scrutinize here the obscure relation of determinism and atomism versus spontaneity. It seems to me that Epicurus by introducing a category of swerve into Democritus’ version of atomism made a step, radical from the point of view of basic or mechanical determinism, yet still not sufficient for explaining how human freedom is possible. What the notion of swerve adds is that determinism is more complex. What is called a random movement is introduced, and, accordingly, it is more difficult to anticipate the result of movement than in the case of movement without swerve. But this is not enough to found a basis for a freedom action. In Epicurean atomism the human being is still a complex of atoms and if this view is to be consistent\(^3\), he is nothing but an outcome of movement and interactions of atoms of which he is composed, yet now more complicated than in Democritus’ account. I guess whether in determinism there can be a random movement at all or if it is only what – because of our ignorance concerning much more complicated mechanics – looks like a random movement. Randomness and freedom can be confused at the epistemic level\(^4\) by he who has no knowledge of how a process goes or ignores all data needed to make a right prediction\(^5\). For unpredict-

\(^1\) Kinetic and katastematic are two adjectives by which I render, as many others do, respectively, kata kinesin and katastematikai. Kata kinesin, literally: in view of motion or according to motion, a less comfortable solution. For katastematikos see LSJ: καταστηµατικός, ή, ήν, pertaining to a state or condition [...] opp. κατά κίνησιν, ἡ δοναί Epicur. Fr. 2, cf. Metrod. Fr. 29.

\(^2\) I owe this remark to Piotr Drazkiewicz. Cezary Domaiński evinces as a point common to Epicurus and Ribot their opinions on the nature of memory (a personal communication per nuntium electronicum, Sept. 2016).

\(^3\) Unless Epicurus is committed to a weak rather than a strong atomism, I can hardly see how it can be claimed as does J. S. Purinton, Epicurus on the Telos, p. 304 that [i]ndeed, to speak more generally, Epicurus’ hedonism, so far as I can see, is entirely independent of his atomism; he could have said everything that he says about pleasure (except, of course, that pleasures can be redescribed as motions of atoms) even if he were not an atomist.

\(^4\) From the epistemic point of view it seems that if determinism is true, we cannot know about it because all we do and know, including arguing for or against determinism, is but an event of the causal chain.

\(^5\) For instance A. A. Long, Chance and laws of nature, pp. 165–166 suggests [...] that, although
ability presupposed by what is called random is not the same as avoidability presupposed by freedom.

A second issue difficult to cope with is the body/mind distinction within an atomist approach, in our case bodily versus mental pleasures. If a human being is a complex of atoms the question is how a complex can be influenced or administered by he who is this complex. It may appear that even if the human being acts spontaneously this is a spontaneity for which he cannot be held responsible. O’Keefe claims that:

[...] the Epicureans identify mental processes with atomic processes [...]

and, he presents it thus:

The main Epicurean argument for believing that the mind is something bodily is based on the causal interaction of the mind and body, as follows [...]:
1. The mind moves the body and is moved by the body.
2. Only bodies can move and be moved by other bodies.
3. Therefore, the mind is a body.

But how, then, can it be that [u]sing our reason, we can overcome hate, envy and contempt [...]¹, that is, how a complex of atoms can be self–governing in any way whatsoever? If mind is a body, it does not make sense, in my view, to speak about bodily versus mental processes and a distinction between mental and bodily pleasures and pains⁴ is just verbal and amounts to nothing more than a distinction between bodily tout court (= bodily) and bodily with a qualification (= mental). But even if so, the qualification should be spelled out. That mental amounts in this respect to atomic is approved by Konstan:

theoretically Epicurus has to allow the possibility of chance events in virtue of the swerve, since the basis for this indeterminism falls well below the threshold of perception, it is quite compatible with the operation of physical laws and determinate motions caused by the weight and impact at the macroscopic or observable level. He could maintain, with much plausibility, that because the soul, as he understands it, is composed of the finest and most mobile of all structures, it is only in this exceptional case that the minimal swerve of a single atom disrupts the ‘bonds of fate’ (Lucret. 2.254) to the extent of facilitating an observable event – voluntary action – that is not predictable and determined by antecedent causes (I underline). This is an epistemic issue.Ontically it makes no difference in considering the issue of freedom whether mechanics is ruled on regular or irregular basis as long as its rules are determinist. It lacks consistency within a determinist theory to say, as D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 181 does, that attention may be voluntary or involuntary. For a recent overview of arguments and discussion see J. Baggini, Freedom Regained.

¹ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 61.
³ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 66. As reported by DL 10, 117: [...] hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the wise man overcomes by reason (transl. R. D. Hicks). One may of course argue for an inaccuracy of Diogenes Laertius’ report. See T. Dorandi, Diogene Laerzio, Epicuro e gli editori ..., p. 295: [...] le Vite mancarono della revisione finale e che il loro autore non aveva ancora organizzato il suo materiale in maniera definitiva.
⁴ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 117.
atomic change in the complex of body and psyche just is mental change¹
and, also, by O’Keefe himself, because he tells us:

In some sense, of course, all pleasures and pains are mental [...] Likewise, in some sense all pleasures and pains are bodily [...]².

Saying that mental experiences are those for which one has to have a mind in order to experience them³ and bodily experiences are those which are experienced by minds [which] are corporeal⁴ is useful for showing that mental experiences can be analyzed from two points of view but is not sufficient for proving that these two kinds of experiences are actually two different ones and not one and the same. I rather think that, on the whole, anyone who supports the dichotomy of bodily versus mental and subscribes to the thesis about the exclusively atomic structure of the world should elucidate in what sense atomic when applied to bodily differs from atomic when applied to mental.

3. An overview of the interpretations of Epicurus’ distinction
In a recent overview of Epicurus’ opinion on emotions C. Gill observes from the very beginning:

[...] our evidence for Epicurean thinking on emotion causes difficulties,
since, as he says, in his writings
very little is directly on emotions⁵.

A textual basis for the distinction I want to discuss is the following:

ἡ µ ὲ ν γ ὰ ταραξία κα ὶ <ἡ> ἀ πονία καταστηµατικαί εἰσιν ἡ δοναί· ἡ δ ὲ χαρά, κα ὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ [ἐνέργειᾳ] βλέπονται. (fr. 2 Usener = DL 10, 136, 10–12)

Gosling and Taylor’s translation is:

For ataraxia and aponia are katastematic pleasures; but joy and well-being are seen in actuality in motion (κινήσις).⁶

Commentators’ interpretations vary. Let me begin with Guyau who distinguished:

[...] le plaisir du mouvement, qui n’est que le remède à une douleur [...] du vrai et pur plaisir, qui est le plaisir stable et constitutif, καταστηµατική.⁷

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² T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, pp. 117–118.
³ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 117.
⁴ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 118.
⁵ C. Gill, Stoicism and Epicureanism, p. 155.
⁷ J.–M. Guyau, La morale d’Epicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines, p. 51.
For Krokiewicz katastematic pleasures and kinetic pleasures do not form an opposition. In his view, the confusion comes from considering, probably under the influence of Cyrenaic philosophy, katastematic pleasures as consisting in rest as opposed to motion. Yet, there is no such thing as an absolute state of rest, because in all organism atoms are always in motion. Therefore, the distinction to be traced is between a perfect and imperfect kind of motion.

Among more recent scholars, Gosling and Taylor make the following distinction:

\[ \text{[...] the process of removal of pain will be a process of extending the area of pleasure, so increasing pleasure, and this process is what has been called kinetic pleasure, but once that process is over there can be no increase of pleasure, only variation according to the perception operative in the painless condition. This variety, however, is variety in katastematic pleasure.} \]

while for Giannantoni, the distinction is clear and easy to grasp:

\[ \text{[...] il piacere catastematico è quello che soddisfa i desideri naturali e necessari; il piacere cinetico è quello che soddisfa i desideri naturali ma non necessari [...]}. \]

Long and Sedley simply claim that:

\[ \text{[...] it is clear that Epicurus posted 'static' and 'kinetic' pleasures both of mind and body.} \]

G. Striker is less positive and uses the conditional practically throughout her conclusion:

\[ \text{It might be better to say that Epicurus proposed to extend the use of the word 'pleasure' to cover not only episodes, but also states of body and mind, on the ground that what makes experiences pleasurable is precisely absence of pain, which can be a lasting state. The distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures would seem to derive from Epicurus' theory, rather than from an empirical survey of the} \]

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2 See also J. C. B. Gosling & C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, p. 370: *The picture is of a living thing in a state of constant motion of its atoms [...] There is no place for a static or non-perceptive condition of pleasure. And pp. 374-375: Epicurus’ account of the organism quite generally is in terms of the movements of atoms, so that it is difficult to know what ‘katastematic’ is referring to.*
4 J. C. B. Gosling & C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, p. 377. See also p. 377: *[...] we are not saying that all sensory pleasures are katastematic [...] katastematic pleasure is pleasure of the organism in proper condition. And p. 392: The outcome of all this is that there is no conclusive evidence for the view that all sensory pleasures are kinetic.*
5 G. Giannantoni, *Il piacere cinetico nell’etica epicurea*, p. 44.
various phenomena described as pleasures in everyday language. [...] So I would suggest that he introduced the notion of katastematic pleasure in order to show that happiness can be the same as pleasure after all, provided that one is willing to accept as pleasures not only episodes of enjoyment, but also those states that, according to Epicurus, make one’s life enjoyable at every moment.¹

Erler and Schofield are prudent too:

[... such pleasure as katastematic [...] is a stable condition [...] when the body is in such a katastēma, it is entirely free of pain [...] What matters most for Epicurean ethics in the end is not katastematic pleasure itself, but the joy and delight it gives us. For joy and delight are forms of awareness, or pathē, as katastematic pleasure is not. Presumably it is this that leads Epicurus to make them kinetic pleasures [...].²

As for Warren, he writes:

The first, what they called ‘kinetic’ pleasure, is the pleasure which accompanies the process of removing a pain (for example, the pleasure of drinking to relieve a thirst). The second, what they called ‘katastematic’ pleasure, is the pleasure of not being in pain or need (for example, the pleasure of not being thirsty).³

In what is a new edition of his Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology (1973), D. Konstan reviews other scholars’ positions and makes a distinction between static or katastematic pleasures on the one hand and kinetic or dynamic ones on the other⁴. He speaks also about the katastematic or stable condition of the body or soul⁵ but he doesn’t offer a transparent taxonomy. In conclusion Konstan distinguishes:

[...] two levels of the soul, the one irrational and the seat of sensations and feelings or pathē, the other rational and the locus of those emotions that depend essentially on belief.⁶

¹ G. Striker, Epicurean hedonism, p. 17.
² M. Erler & M. Schofield, Epicurean Ethics, p. 656.
⁵ D. Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods, p. 16.
⁶ D. Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods, p. 25. Speaking about two levels of the soul, already a distinctly organized entity within atomist, is thought-provoking.
C. Gill makes the following point:

One such distinction is between kinetic and katastematic pleasures (transient or episodic and stable or static pleasures) […] both types of pleasure include bodily and psychological dimensions; for instance, both absence of physical pain and mental distress are presented as katastematic pleasures.¹

whereas R. Woolf, in the same volume, claims that

[...] we are told, with a citation of Epicurus’ own words, that he distinguished ‘katastematic’ or ‘static’ pleasures from pleasures ‘in motion’ or ‘kinetic’ pleasures; and treated freedom from pain and distress as static, joy and delight as kinetic (DL 10.136). One might thus talk of ‘static’ pleasure as consisting in a state of mental and bodily satisfaction.²

On T. O’Keefe’s reading:

The second distinction Epicurus makes is between kinetic and katastematic pleasures. “Kinetic” pleasures, as the name suggests, involve movement. Bodily kinetic pleasures are associated with some sort of active titillation of the senses […] associated with the process of satisfying […] state – not being in pain or need, of having one’s desire satisfied – is not merely a neutral state, but another type of pleasure, a “katastematic” pleasure.³

and he adds:

On the mental side, Epicurus classifies “joy” as a kinetic pleasure (DL X 137). And the mental katastematic pleasure of being free from regret, fear and anxiety is ataraxia, or tranquillity.⁴

He concludes by claiming:

So what distinguishes kinetic and katastematic pleasures is that kinetic pleasures are ones we are aware of while in the process of replenishing ourselves and restoring our natural state, whereas katastematic pleasures are the ones we are aware of when we are in the state of functioning naturally and healthy.⁵

¹ C. Gill, Psychology, p. 139.
² R. Woolf, Pleasure and desire, pp. 170–171.
³ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, pp. 119–120.
⁴ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 120.
⁵ T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 123.
Finally, C. Gill, in another paper mentioned already above and published the same year as O’Keefe’s book, says that:

[…] the absence of pain in the body and absence of disturbance in the mind (aponia and ataraxia) […] are also sometimes defined as ‘static’ or dispositional pleasure, by contrast with the ‘kinetic’ pleasures which involve movement towards these states or variation in the way they are experienced.¹

If I have quoted various views on more than three pages, this is for the convenience of the reader so that he could make his own judgement about them forthwith, without going to his private or any other library for checking them one by one, and to provide him with a general review of how Epicurus’ distinction is read. Now, let me isolate essential elements of the above interpretations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guyau (1927)</td>
<td>καταστηµατικά κατά κίνησιν ἐνέργεια [ἐνέργεια] stable &amp; constitutive motion, [le remède =] fulfilment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krokiewicz (1929)</td>
<td>perfect motion imperfection motion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gosling &amp; Taylor (1982)</td>
<td>painless condition removal of pain, a process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giannantoni (1984)</td>
<td>related to natural and necessary desires removed desirability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long &amp; Sedley (1987)</td>
<td>static (both of mind and body) states of body and mind</td>
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<tr>
<td>Striker (1993)</td>
<td>episodes [of body and mind]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erler &amp; Schofield (1999)</td>
<td>a stable condition kinetic, forms of awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren (2004)</td>
<td>katastematic (without being in pain or need) kinetic (process of removing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konstan (2008)</td>
<td>static (achieving) dynamic (acquiring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gill (2009)</td>
<td>stable or static (bodily and psychological dimensions) transient or episodic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolf (2009)</td>
<td>static, satisfaction (both mental and bodily) in motion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ C. Gill, Stoicism and Epicureanism, p. 157.
What can be inferred from this collection of quotes which, far from being exhaustive, is, I hope, a representative one? What is the common denominator, if any, of all of them? I think that the above commentators broadly agree that καταστηµατικαί equals to motion, accomplishing (bringing to satisfaction), or process, whereas καταστηµατικαὶ corresponds to stability, accomplishment, (durable) state or condition. Not all of them characterize καταστηµατικαὶ as associated with a need and episodicality, and καταστηµατικαί as disposition, unrelated to lack or need. Neither are they all explicit about the two categories being applied to both body and mind. I think that the least that can be said is that the distinction between kinetic and katastematic is as strong (or as weak) as between process and state, the dynamic and the static, or to speak more ontically, between becoming and being. The former is relative or reactive and the second is self–determined.

4. An analysis of the Epicurean distinction

Let me reproduce Epicurus’ words once again:

η μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηµατικαὶ εἰσίν ἢδοναί· ἡ δὲ χάρα, καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι

(Usener = DL 10, 136, 10–12)

For the sake of analysis I translate it as literally as I am able to:

ataraxy and lack–of–pain are katastematic pleasures, joy and delight are regarded as activities according to [or: in view of] motion.²

What is visible is that, first and more formally, there is no morphological parallelism of categories which qualify both genera: we have the adjective καταστηµατικαὶ versus a preposition with a noun (κατὰ κίνησιν), not two adjectives (καταστηµατικαὶ versus κινητικαί). This makes the symmetry more opaque.³

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¹ The variant accepted recently by T. Dorandi in: Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, (ed.) T. Dorandi. See below.

² Compare J. C. B. Gosling & C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, p. 388: [...] in actuality in motion (κινήσις), p. 390: [...] in actuality by/in motion, and further, same page: [...] by motion. See also D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 166: the phrase “involving change through activation” (κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεία), the phrase “involving change through activation” (καταστηµατικαὶ versus κινητικαί). This makes the symmetry more opaque.

³ I wouldn’t be ready to correct Epicurus too quickly, for, as G. Striker, Epicurean hedonism, p. 4, writes, we should take Epicurus for neither naive nor stupid.
Second and less formally, there is no parallelism between the genus term of ἡ δοναί including ἀταραξία and ἀπονία on the one hand and, as one could expect and as seems to be the case of the general interpretation\(^1\), a genus term of ἡ δοναί (pleasures) including χαρά and ἐυφροσύνη on the other: the latter are called ἑνέργειαι (activities). Is this to say that ἡ δοναί and ἑνέργειαι are interchangeable terms? Or are they actually one and the same? Or only ἀταραξία and ἀπονία are ἡ δοναί (but not ἑνέργειαι), while χαρά and ἐυφροσύνη are ἑνέργειαι (but not ἡ δοναί)? If one privileges the last option, then it is hard to speak about a comparison. In order to compare pleasures to activities a genus to which pleasures and activities belong should be detailed.

If these two points are valid and if there is neither taxonomical nor morphological parallel, then maybe there is no parallelism at all in the passage or if there is any, it is not as sharp as contrasting two categories of exclusive genera. The state of affairs is, however, different for anyone who prefers to keep or is willing to accept the variant provided by the manuscript:

η μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηματικά εἰσίν ἡ δοναί· ἡ δὲ χαρά, καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἑνέργεια βλέπονται.

The translation I suggest this time is:

ataraxy and lack–of–pain are katastematic pleasures, joy and delight are regarded as `<pleasures ?> by virtue of activity according to [or: in view of] motion.

Long and Sedley, reference supporters of the emendation, limit themselves to asserting quite rashly that

9 ἑνέργειαι Our emendment, which is merely orthographic, is an attempt to restore grammar and sense. The dative has never been satisfactorily explained.\(^2\)

Their argument against the variant of the manuscript is the incomprehensibility of the text. But is it incomprehensible indeed? Long and Sedley say that

[the terms ἀταραξία and ἀπονία evidently pick out mental and bodily absence of pain respectively, but χαρά and ἐυφροσύνη are most naturally interpreted as two terms for kinetic pleasure each of which can apply to mind or body.\(^3\)]

One can doubt if χαρά and ἐυφροσύνη are most naturally interpreted in the way Long and Sedley suggest, more particularly since they give no reason for

\(^{1}\) E.g. J. C. B. Gosling & C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, p. 388. Although their translation is the most literal I have found, from what follows it is clear that they understand pleasures as intended: [this makes Epicurus put joy and well–being down as kinetic pleasures [...].


that and, also, because the variant ἐνέργειαι doesn’t efface the difficulty of the text entirely. If one adopts it, as many do, he should explain the relation or opposition of (katastematic) pleasure versus (kinetic) activities, which I would hardly take to be natural. Instead of such explanation I rather see a tacit passage from (katastematic) pleasures versus (kinetic) activities towards (katastematic) pleasures versus (kinetic) pleasures.

In his recent critical edition Tiziano Dorandi follows Long and Sedley’s correction (ἐνέργειαι) and his apparatus indicates: ἐνέργειαι A. Long: ἐνέργεια BP : ἐνέργεια Π. Asked explicitly about my suggestion Dorandi told me that after re–examining the context he still has doubts about the dative ἐνέργεια. If accepted, he prefers however to understand it as in actuality by analogy with DL 10, 121b.

Among those who defend the dative is J. S. Purinton. I share his view and think that it is better to preserve the manuscript variant as long as its text can be explained. And I explain it as I have just done above: I follow the dative and I make explicit the word pleasures that I take to be implied in the text: ataraxy and lack–of–pain are katastematic pleasures, joy and delight are regarded as pleasures by virtue of activity according to [or: in view of] motion.

Even if this is more difficult grammatically, this option has two advantages: it doesn’t modify the variant of the manuscript and it saves the parallelism of the two notions in question. I keep my suggestion as a pure hypothesis. If it is rejected we are left with pleasures opposed to activities. Then, it should be asked what the contrast between pleasures and activities means. If it be accepted, it should be investigated what pleasures by virtue of activity according to [or: in view of] motion stands for.

Let then for a while the difference be between state and process, without going into questioning to what extent pleasures versus activities corresponds to pleasures versus pleasures. This is an opposition, true. But it is approximate or intuitive rather than clear–cut or categorial. If one wants the difference to

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2 A personal communication per nuntium electronicum, Sept. 2016.
3 For J. S. Purinton, Epicurus on the Telos, p. 288, Epicurus is saying that “the joy and delight” which are taken in such kinetic pleasures “are experienced in activity” (ἐνέργεια βαλενταί), i.e., arise as states of consciousness in virtue of just such instances of active pursuit. Purinton suggests, p. 290, that the joy taken in katastematic pleasure does not arise ἐνέργεια; on the contrary, it is only the χαρὰ κατὰ κίνησιν – and the εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν – which “are experienced in activity.” And, p. 291, that it should not be taken to assert that joy and delight are kinetic pleasures, but rather to assert that they are intentional states which have pleasures as their objects. But he also goes as far as to grant a mental state with an existence independent from the mind, p. 292: as the sound is still a sound even if it is not being heard, so a pleasure is still a pleasure even if it is not being enjoyed (the mind being focused on something else). A given pleasure, in other words, exists independently of the joy which it may or may not be inspiring, which is to say that, whether or not the mind is focusing on it and rejoicing in its presence, it is what it is: a “motion” (κίνησις) or “state” (κατάστημα) of the body or soul which counts as a pleasure simply because it could be an object of joy. I think that the ontological status of sounds and pleasures is different and doesn’t permit of putting them on one level as Purinton does.
4 Or better: a pleasure by virtue of activity because of motion. See LSJ: κατὰ [...] B. WITH Acc. [...] IV. of fitness or conformity, in accordance with [...] i.e. because of [...] καθ’ ἡ δονήν τι δρῶν, ποιεῖν [...].
be as it is between one responding to a need or a lack versus another not reactive, autonomous, going by itself, one may think about the distinction put forward by Plato between mixed and pure pleasure. If this is the case we have Epicurus, who is either, to some extent, plagiarizing or drawing on Plato or having something different in mind. Since the first option is not productive philosophically (though it can be true historically), I opt for the second as a more promising research thesis (without claiming that historically this option is the right one).

Now, there are two ways of approaching the passage: either by taking καταστηματικαί and κατά κίνησιν as known to determine the meaning of ἀταραξία, ἀπόνια, χαρά, and εὐφροσύνη or to do the opposite and to treat the four words are known and circumscribe the meaning of καταστηματικαί and κατά κίνησιν in accordance with what the two pairs are. At first glance the second option looks more natural because the four words are more frequent in the Greek corpus, Epicurus included, than the two technical qualifications καταστηματικαί and κατά κίνησιν endowed with their peculiar senses given them by Epicurus. But just as ἡδονή's meaning can vary, so is for the four words. We may agree that ἡδονή means pleasure and χαρά means joy, but since this is just a translation from one language into another this is a small step towards knowing what the concepts of pleasure and joy (or satisfaction and cheerfulness) mean.

For this we need contexts or, better, definitions in Epicurus we don’t possess. For instance, in the Stoics, though the wording seems to be similar, the taxonomy is not, let alone the value ascribed to these terms. For them ἡδονή has a counterpart, χαρά, which includes τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμίαι. The Stoics put then, quite as Epicurus, ἡδονή on the one side, while χαρά and εὐφροσύνη on the other. But for the Stoics εὐφροσύνη is a species of the genus χαρά and, more importantly, whereas for the Stoics ἡδονή is one of four πάθη, and χαρά belongs to εὐπαθείαι, Epicurus doesn’t evaluate either positively or negatively these terms. If one wanted to evaluate Epicurus’ items he should probably recognize that χαρά and εὐφροσύνη are less germane to the philosophical life than ἀταραξία and

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1 See Plato, *Philebus* 52ε: οὐκότι ἢ ἡδονή διακεκρίθη χαράς τας τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκάθισμας ὀρθὰς ἢ λέχθεισας. (transl. Fowler: And now that we have fairly well separated the pure pleasures and those which may be pretty correctly called impure). This point was raised by G. Striker, *Epicurean hedonism*, p. 15, n. 11: As I understand it, the distinction coincides with Plato’s distinction between ‘mixed’ and ‘unmixed’ pleasures in the *Philebus* [...].

2 Please remark I don’t mean words (e.g. why joy and delight rather than gaiety and merriment) but concepts. In consequence, it does not make sense to discuss Epicurus’ distinction from the terminological point of view. See R. Woolf, *Pleasure and desire*, p. 170, n. 20: The correct way to label and characterize this distinction remains highly controversial [...]. My own treatment attempts in a rather broad-brush way to understand what might be motivating the distinction; it makes no effort to get to grips with the linguistic niceties with which Epicurus (as reported) sets it out. According to A. Krokiewicz, *Nauka Epikura*, p. 99, Epicurus was not keen on setting a precise terminology. More, it seems he was even hostile to dialectic formalism. The example given by Krokiewicz is synonymity of πρόληψις, κατάληψις, δόξα ὀρθή, ἐννοια, καθολικὴ νόησις ἐναποκένη, ἐπιβολή.

3 See DL 7, 116, 1–11: Εἴησα δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας χαράς τερψίς, χαράς, εὐλαβείας, βούλησιν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χαράν εὐφροσύνην ἐποίησαν [...]. ἦν ἡ ἤδονὴ [...]. ὅπως ἡ ἤδονὴ τερψίς, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν. Here and below, unless stated otherwise, underlining is mine.
απονία, while for the Stoics this is the opposite: χαρά and ευφροσύνη are states of a true philosopher who is devoid of ηδονή. Whatever is the importance granted to lexical similarities and taxonomical differences between the Stoics’ and Epicurus’ approach, it doesn’t teach us a lot, I am afraid, about Epicurus’ words’ meaning.

Therefore, I limit myself to a somewhat sceptical conclusion as follows:

i) In the passage we have four terms forming two pairs of two distinct categories without, however, explicitly saying to which kind the two categories belong. The two pairs are opposed mainly on syntactical grounds (ἡ µὲν [...] ἢ δὲ [...]1).

ii) The two pleasures of the first pair are – etymologically – negations. I don’t want to stress it too much, yet it is characteristic that the category of katastematic pleasures is marked by a kind of apophaticism, so to speak.

However, we should not take the two types of the genus plus four species terms as forming a full list. While in DL 10, 136, 10 ataraxy is a sub–category of pleasures, in DL 10, 128, 3 ataraxy is contributing to blessedness2 and in DL 10, 128, 11 blessedness has its end in a pleasant life3. It looks as if blessedness were a middle term between ataraxy and pleasure, and, moreover, ataraxy had two senses at two separate levels. Next, pleasures (ηδοναί) or rather their addition or subtraction plays a role in only one kind of happiness4. This shows that the family of pleasure–joy–happiness–blessedness is more complex than a twofold two–tier model5. It also shows, I think, that the division into katastematic and kinetic pleasures is only one of multiple classifications6 and by no means exhausts the divisions within the family. It is just one of them and perceived from a particular angle. Unfortunately, neither is the family named nor the angle defined.

1 For a similar sort of opposition, much more focused on by commentators than present in the text, see e.g. DK 68 B 31 and DK 68 B 236, or better, DK 68 B 236 in the context of DK 22 B 85. For relevant comments see R. Zaborowski, Sur le sentiment chez les Présocratie, pp. 31–37 & pp. 95–101.

2 [...] τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔγνυεν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνεπανείπεν ἐπεὶ τούτο τοῦ ἱεροτάτου γίνεται τέλος (transl. Hicks: health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life). See also D. Konstan, Epicurean Happiness: A Pig’s Life?, p. 18: The combination of the pleasure deriving from a body free from pain and that of a soul free from distress, accompanied, it may be, by pleasant thoughts and sensations, constitutes the highest form and final end of human happiness.

3 [...] καὶ ἀλλ’ ἄλλης ἡ δοναί ἀρχή καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ ἱεροτάτου γίνεται τέλος (transl. Hicks: Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life.).

4 See DL 10, 121a, 1–3: Τὴν ἐπιδαιμονὴν διχόν δοναίνειν, τὴν τε ἀκροτάτην, όποι έστι περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἐπιτάσσειν οὐκ ἔχοισαν· καὶ τὴν «κατὰ τὴν» προσφημίσαν καὶ αὐξάνουσαν ἤδοναν. (transl. Hicks: Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.)

5 See also fr. 548 Usener: τὸ ἐπιδαιμονὸν καὶ μικρὸνον ὑπὸ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδέ προγράμματος ὁγονον οὐδ’ ἀρχαί τινας ἔχουσιν οὐδέ δυνάμεις, άλλ’ ἀληθῶς καὶ πραγμάτως παθόν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ ψύχαν ἄντιστατα. (Happiness and blessedness are possessed not by great riches nor vast possessions nor some functions nor powers, but by lack–of pain and calmness of feelings, and disposition of the soul to limit them according to nature.)

6 See Y. Z. Liebersohn, Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures, pp. 271–272: Four pairs of terms are found to be used in Epicurus’ theory of pleasures: kinetic–katastematic, necessary–unnecessary, bodily–mental, natural–unnatural.
We have therefore a twofold two–tier division of pleasure: katastematic and kinetic both of body and mind\(^1\) with a kind of hierarchy with somewhat vague criterion of size\(^2\) and with no clear and univocal reading of this division. Interpreters follow two main ways of viewing this division: either as process versus disposition or replenishment versus fulfilment and well–being. At present I am going to add a third one by applying retrospectively the Ribotian description and explanation of the division. This is inspired by the fact that Ribot uses the terms dynamic and static to qualify two kinds of passions and also because the two groups he qualifies so are just one of three families within the class of affectivity quite as ἡ δοναί are one of three species of a broader genus unnamed by Epicurus. It is intriguing. Ribot tells more and in a more explicit way than did Epicurus. We have not only more than a few fragments from Ribot but his text is also certain and his vocabulary and concepts are almost contemporaneous with ours.

5. Théodule Ribot’s distinction

I start with a definition of passions. Ribot provides us with one\(^3\) which makes a significant difference to Epicurus who is not that explicit about what ἡ δοναί are in his view:

\[
En \ un \ mot \ et \ sauf \ quelques \ réserves \ qui \ seront \ faites \ plus \ tard, \ la \ passion \ est \ une \ émotion \ prolongée \ et \ intellectualisée \ [...].
\]

As it is, passion is conceptually dependent on emotion, which is:

\[
[...] \ la \ réaction \ soudaine, \ brusque \ [...] \ se \ définit \ par \ deux \ caractères \ principaux: \ l'intensité, \ la \ brièveté.\(^2\)
\]

If so, passion is to be understood as a reaction originally abrupt, short and intense, then prolonged and intellectualised. This means that intensity and

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1. See DL 10, 136, 2–6: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν ὡς ἕγκρινον, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει; ὅ δὲ ἐμφύτευσε τὰ γένην ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὡς φησίν ἐν τῷ Περί αἰρέσεως καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περί τελείου καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περί βιῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνη φίλους ἐπιστολήν. (transl. Hicks: \textit{They [i.e. the Cyrenaics] do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both, also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene.})

2. See DL 10, 137, 5–6: οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἑξάνεισσε ἡ δοναί εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. (transl. Hicks: \textit{In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.}) But what greater means is unclear. We don’t know whether it pertains to intensity, duration or value.

3. Ribot’s approach has been recently commented on by L. C. Charland, \textit{Moral Undertow and the Passions} . . . , p. 87. But this is a puzzling paper since Charland (i) quotes nonexistent editions of Ribot’s works, e.g. Ribot, T. (1907). \textit{Essai sur les passions}. Paris, France: L’Harmattan, and (ii) he seems to deform Ribot’s view when writing: \textit{Ribot’s psychological theory of the affective life is built around three main affective postis: feelings (sentiments), emotions (émotions), and passions (passions) (Ribot 1896 [with no page given]). [...] In this scheme, feelings and emotions are among the more fleeting, unstable, and transient forms of affectivity. In fact, what Th. Ribot, \textit{Essai sur les passions}, p. 5, says is that Le terme le plus général paraît le plus convenable: Sentiments ou états affectifs.}


intellectualisation are as much contrasted as briefness and duration are. Please note that the full systematics of affectivity is indicated by Ribot earlier:

Pour la clarté de mon exposition, je répartis les manifestations de la vie sentimentale en trois groupes: les états affectifs proprement dits, les émotions, les passions.\(^1\)

The Epicurus–like distinction goes in Ribot as follows (one context in 1896 and translated into English in 1897 and several others in a later work published in 1907\(^2\)):

I can only admit one division, which has the advantage of simplicity, and, more especially, of being based on the very nature of the emotional process. This is, into the pleasures and pains accompanying research or the acquisition of knowledge, and those which are attached to its possession, or the state of being without it. The former are dynamic, the second static.\(^3\)

and more, eleven years later:

Le premier type est celui des passions dites dynamiques qui conservent [...] une affinité de nature avec les instincts, impulsions et émotions. [...] l’élément moteur est le plus fort, l’élément intellectuel est le plus faible. Le second type est celui des passions statiques, plutôt apparentées à la réflexion qui, de sa nature, est inhibitrice. [...] l’élément intellectuel est le plus fort, l’élément moteur est le plus faible.\(^4\)

In the first passage a qualification dynamic/static is not limited to passions only but concerns the very nature of the emotional process. Moreover the distinction is applied to pleasure and pain. Thirdly, examples – quite rare (for the reason see below) – of the distinction dynamic/static correspond to research versus knowledge, that is process versus state, acquisition towards a possession versus possession of what has been acquired. In the second context dynamic/static distinction is described by means of motor versus intellectual element.

If we still keep in mind what passions are, i.e. prolonged and intellectualised emotions, it means that we obtain two kinds of prolonged and intellectualised emotions, passions for short. We obtain – but Ribot is not that explicit – within a family of prolonged and intellectualised phenomena two subclasses: (i) prolonged and intellectualised, yet less intellectualised but with stronger motor element and closer to emotions, i.e. dynamic passions, and (ii)

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2 Unless I am mistaken, neither in *La logique des sentiments* (1905) nor in *Problèmes de psychologie affective* (1910) Ribot makes use of it.
prolonged and intellectualised, this is more intellectualized and close to reflection, i.e. static passions.

Ribot makes twice a reference to Epicurus but in another work, a posterior one to the two mentioned above. What he says about Epicurus is this:

«Selon Épicure, remarque Brochard, le bonheur est toujours à la portée et dépend toujours de la volonté du sage, parce que les images affectives, plaisirs et douleurs de l’âme, forment pour lui un monde idéal qu’il peut opposer au monde réel des sentiments présents, c’est-à-dire aux plaisirs et douleurs du corps; en sorte qu’il peut conserver la sérénité et la joie au milieu des plus grandes souffrances corporelles.»

[Année philosophique, 1903, p. 2 et suiv. (F. Alcan)]

Ce pouvoir n’est pas déparvi à tous et ne réussit pas toujours, – les tempéraments pessimistes ne s’y prêtent guère, – mais il n’est pas assez rare pour être négligé. 1

And:

3° Dans la phase extrême de son ascension, le plaisir devient une activité exubérante, ἡ δον ἐν κινήσει des Epicuriens, qui exige et finalement épuise toutes les ressources de la vie. Les tempéraments impulsifs ou passionnés sont prédisposés à la répétition fréquente de ces accès, quoique tous les hommes les connaissent, sauf peut-être les apathiques. […] Le plaisir intense suppose une diffusion des phénomènes moteurs dans l’organisme. 2

The first quote is, it seems to me, irrelevant to the topic here. In the second, although he makes use of Epicurus’ words, only one of his two expressions appears. More to the point, Ribot refers to the Epicurean phrase as something generally known and in no way whatsoever does he make a remark on his drawing on Epicurus’ distinction leaving aside katastematic pleasure 3. Ribot uses the formula ἡ δον ἐν κινήσει of Epicureans as a ready–made concept he refers to as a synonym of pleasure that becomes exuberant activity. It shows that Ribot was acquainted with Epicurus, whose notion was the most obvious and a useful reference, yet without Epicurus being a source for him. It also shows us that Ribot understands Epicurus’ expression as close to or synonymous with intensity, which, in turn, is associated with the motor element. It could be – with prudence – concluded that katastematic pleasure is

1 Th. Ribot, Problèmes de psychologie affective, p. 44.
2 Th. Ribot, Problèmes de psychologie affective, pp. 135–136.
3 I prefer not to decide to what extent, if at all, Ribot’s knowledge of Epicurus may have guided him to his distinction, just as I haven’t decided whether Epicurus may have followed Plato in relation to pure and mixed pleasure.
not about intensity and doesn’t include or include much less of the motor element than kinetic pleasure, yet without coinciding with apathy\(^1\).

6. Epicurus and Théodule Ribot in parallel

Ribot – we have no similar element in Epicurus – comments on the character of his division (la division en dynamiques et statiques d’après la constitution motrice de chaque passion et ses modalités), for he observes that:

*Toutefois cette division elle-même est superficielle et exprime une différence de forme plus que de nature intime [...]*\(^2\).

Taken as a distinction of form rather than content it must be nevertheless considered useful for some reasons, more especially since, in what follows, Ribot sustains his distinction:

*Toutes choses égales, les passions statiques, qui sont par nature raisonnées et inhibitoires, sont plus stables que les passions dynamiques, qui sont naturellement impulsives.*\(^3\)

What we are therefore left with is a vague distinction and what is the most strange is that it is formed by an intrinsic feature (par nature) attenuated by a quantitative one (plus). Peculiar as it can be, something similar comes out in Epicurus, since size of pleasure is a vague distinction, yet it must be intrinsic since it can not be accidental that any mental pleasure is greater than any bodily one (see DL 10, 137, 5–6: μείζονας ἡ δον ἰναι τῆς ψυχῆς, comparans τῶν τοῦ σώματος is intended because of what precedes\(^4\)).

Accordingly, just as in Epicurus mental pleasures are greater than bodily pleasure and, less explicitly, katastematic pleasures are of greater value than kinetic ones\(^5\), so in Ribot static passions are more stable than dynamic ones.

Epicurus’ fr. 2 is short. But various comments mirrors Ribotian terminology when interpreting Epicurus’ distinction. So Stokes:

\(^{1}\) Here apathy is taken as a clinical term, while below it will be meant according to its etymological sense (apatheia) and as used by the Stoics.

\(^{2}\) Th. Ribot, *Essai sur les passions*, p. 135. It may be that Epicurus’ distinctions too are either i) only one of many, or/and ii) of only auxiliary character, and as such should not be overplayed.


\(^{4}\) DL 10, 137, 1–5: [...] οἱ μὲν γὰρ γέφυρας τὰς σωματικὰς ἀληθῶς τῶν ψυχικῶν, κολαζόμεθα γοῦν τῶς ἀμαρτάνοντας σώματος ὃ δὲ τὰς ψυχικὰς, τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειρίζεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ψυχήν καὶ τὸ παρελθόν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ [...] (transl. Hicks: [...] they [i.e. the Cyrenaics] hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains; at all events evil–doers are made to suffer bodily punishment; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way [...] )

\(^{5}\) See DL 10, 131, 8–132, 1: ὅσον οὖν λέγωμεν ἡ δον ἰναί τὴν τῆς ἀσώτων ἡ δον ἰναί τῆς σοφωτοῦ σοφωτοῦ κατὰ ἀπολαύσεις κατὰ σοφωτοῦ σοφωτοῦ, ᾧ τε ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ ὧν ἀμαρτάνοντες ἢ κακῶς ἀκοπείρατος νοημόσωσιν. ὅλα τὸ μίτη ἀλείγιν κατὰ σοφωτὸ σοφωτὶ κατὰ σοφωτοῦ κατὰ σοφωτοῦ νοημόσωσιν. (transl. Hicks: When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.)
[...] the acquisition of the first truth will be with respect to itself a katastematic pleasure, an enjoyment of, and at the same time as, the completion of the process; but in respect of the acquisition of the whole Epicurean system [...] the same bit of learning, or rather its completion, will be part of the kinetic pleasure of journeying towards ever-growing tranquillity.

Compare it with a passage from Ribot that has just been quoted:

[...] the pleasures and pains accompanying research or the acquisition of knowledge, and those which are attached to its possession, or the state of being without it. The former are dynamic, the second static.

And one commentator labels one Epicurean category with Ribotian names: kinetic or dynamic.

In Epicurus’ fr. 2 no example, unfortunately, is given by Epicurus. As for Ribot he too gives none. But, again, Ribot explicates the reason. This is because:

[...] la passion étant individuelle varie selon le tempérament et le caractère. Ainsi, l’amour est par nature plutôt du premier type; mais quelquefois il prend la forme du second. [...] Mon seul but était de rappeler que dans toutes les passions, même les plus calmes en apparence, il y a toujours des éléments moteurs virtuels ou actuels et que, en ce point, la différence entre les deux types est moins de fond que de forme.

What is at stake is an approximation in defining with a corollary that neither type is pure, each being a mixture with one or another type being a predominant and characteristic component in every particular case. Let me therefore look myself for examples of kinetic/katastematic and bodily/mental pleasures. Broadly taken, the pleasure of eating, drinking and sexual activity as well as of running are kinetic, in contrast to the pleasure of lying, which seems static. Kinetic (dynamic) pleasures mean pleasures resulting from an activity which relies on motion, e.g. walking or, say, a pleasure resulting from a motion such as a massage as contrasted with a pleasure resulting from lying motionlessly on a sunbed on the beach and being warmed by sunshine even though taken literally, the warmth spread over the space can be viewed as a

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1 M. C. Stokes, Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures, p. 169. As paraphrased by D. Konstan, A Life Worthy of the Gods, p. 16, n. 23, the similarity of Stokes’ concepts with Ribot’s comes out even more visibly: a temporal distinction between acquiring wisdom (a kinetic pleasure) and achieving it (henceforward, a katastematic pleasure).


3 Th. Ribot, Essai sur les passions, p. 44.

4 See Plato, Gorgias 494d: κνώµενον διατελο ῦ ν τα  τ ὸ ν  βίον ε ὐ δαιµόνως ἔ στι  ζ ῆ ν (transl. Lamb: pass his life happily in continual scratching).
motion, especially when the kinetic theory approach is adopted. In contrast katastematic would be equivalent to an activity without motion. But if a motion, particularly a physical one, is a definitional criterion, it should be asked what kind of motion is meant, for in Epicurus’ theory everything (= the universe) is in a permanent motion because composed of atoms in motion. One may have always in mind the distinction as it is drawn in mechanics, this is between dynamics and statics, the latter being concerned not with an absolute rest but with a rest in relation to the observational reference frame.

For Konstan there can be a static pleasure which does not involve a change of state. But this is impossible. How a pleasure can be sensed if there is no change at all? Or the character of change should be specified: if Konstan has in view physical change, then we get closer to Ribot’s notion of motion of body only, i.e. motor or muscular change. But even then an objection arises, because thinking is also, as we are told these days, an effect of motion. The difference between drinking and being warmed as well as between acquiring and possessing should therefore be spelled out more perspicuously. In what sense is possessing motionless as much as acquiring is a motion?

To make the distinction even more clear I recourse to another example: contemplation. I understand it in Elzenbergian sense: 

By contemplation I mean a specific type of sustained observation, one in which we no longer penetrate the watched thing for exploration thereof but keep aware of all its elements and qualities recognised before [...].

If so, contemplation is a motionless thought, this is a thought not towards something, nor tending to an object. It is intentional, of course, and directed at an object but since its object is already grasped and is given to the thought, contemplation is undertaken – if the verb undertake is appropriate – for no longer penetrating the watched thing for exploration thereof but keep[ing] aware of all its elements and qualities recognised before. A pleasure of

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1 But I may be wrong. As observed by D. Wolfsdorf, Epicurus on Ἐὔφροσύνη ... , pp. 236–237, Diogenes of Oinoanda in fr. 10 considers ejaculation in dream. This raises an objection to my distinction since a person during her sleeping is lying and motionless yet a kind of pleasure considered by Epicurus as kinetic occurs. D. Wolfsdorf, Epicurus on Ἐὔφροσύνη ... , p. 237, speaks about the physical process of ejaculation – maybe physiological would be more appropriate in the sense that this is a motion within/of the organism. But then being warmed by sunshine is not that different a case and my distinction falls down. Maybe ejaculation is accompanied by a dream involving an imagined motion. I pause here.

2 See J. S. Purinton, Epicurus on the Telos, p. 293: [...] the pleasure is simply a motion, a motion in a portion of the animate flesh [...] and Y. Z. Liebersohn, Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures, p. 274, n. 10: This can be either a change of the organism itself or a motion of a sensory organ.


5 A famous word of Aristotle, Metaphysics 982b, pertaining to the very character of philosophy which is done for no profit comes to mind. But Aristotle’s perspective is completely different, so much so that he is virtually irrelevant for considering Epicurus, though for a chronologically opposite reason as compared to Cicero (see below). For in Aristotle: (i) a mental state is either a feeling or a capacity or a disposition (EN 1105b: πνευματικό)
contemplating would be as different to a pleasure of looking at an object because of a motive or for a purpose as katastematic (static) pleasure is to kinetic (dynamic) one. The former is contained in itself and doesn’t produce an external product.  

In parallel to motion of in the subject emerges motion of in object. In this respect observing the sky is different to looking at still life. Once more, in atomist theory there is no motionless object, and even still life or sheet music is in motion. Maybe then what Epicurus has in mind is a perceivable motion: from this angle indeed still life is motionless while the sky is moving. So much for kinetic (dynamic) versus katastematic (static) distinction.

What about the distinction between bodily and mental pleasures? I would say that they can be grasped by means of a distinction between a feeling in which the body is affected and a feeling in which body, though a necessary support of a feeling human being, is not directly affected. This is the distinction between the above sensual pleasure, either kinetic or static, and the pleasant thought emerging when, say, remembering or imagining such a pleasant experience.

7. Further corollaries

Epicurus’ classification is fourfold, while Ribot’s is only twofold: Epicurus’ takes into account not only kinetic and katastematic (in Ribot: dynamic and static) elements but also their bodily or mental aspect. Very good. But a problem remains. Surely the static is hierarchically higher than the

δυνάμεις ἔξεις, see also EE 1220(b) – accordingly this approach hinders the division of emotions into episodes and dispositions or Aristotle is wrong or there is an infinite regress, (ii) contemplation is an activity, as it infers from Aristotle’s Protrepticus, fr. 87 (Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε τέλεια ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀκολούθει ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἔχει τὸ χορὸν, ὡς ὑπὸ ἡ θεωρητικὴ ἐνέργεια πάνω ὑψητὴν, transl. [Ross]: But further, perfect and unimpeded activity contains in itself delight, so that the activity of contemplation must be the most pleasant of all.). See also D. Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom, p. 47: [...] although Epicurus adopts Aristotelian terminology, he does so in the service of an un-Aristotelian conclusion. Contra D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 166: In sum, there is good reason to believe that Epicurus appropriated Aristotle’s term “energeia” in his own understanding of a certain kind of pleasure, namely, kinetic pleasure, a position maintained by D. Wolfsdorf, Epicurus on ἔνεργεια... p. 253. Wolfsdorf argues that this must be so given the word ‘ἐνέργεια’ appears almost exclusively in the works of philosophers: once in Nausiphanes, once in Epicurus [...] ‘ἐνέργεια’ is a technical philosophical term of Aristotelian pedigree.

1 Something vaguely similar in form has been suggested by Y. Z. Liebersohn, Epicurus’ “Kinetic” and “Katastematic” Pleasures, pp. 278–281: I propose to distinguish between “moving towards [an end]”, i.e. movement which has an end (the absence of pain) and “moving qua moving”, i.e. movement which has no end (it is concerned with its own movement) [...] kinetic pleasures turn out to have all their activity included in the activity itself [...] katastematic pleasure is found to move towards an end (= the absolute removal of all pain), and to persist in that absence of pain for as long as that lasts [...].

2 Apparently the most static would be the stone’s state and involving no change at all. This idea was caricatured by Plato in Gorgias (492e & 494a) and by Aristotle in EE (1221a).

3 See Plato, Phaedo 99a: εἰ δὲ τες λέγοι ὅτι ἀνέθω τῷ τὰ ποιήσα ἔχειν καὶ ὄστρα καὶ νευρά καὶ ὄστρα ἀλλὰ ἐχω τούτῳ ἀνέθω τῷ ποιήσα μοι, ἀληθή ἐν λέγων (trans. Lamb): If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right.) and also N. Hartmann, New Ways of Ontology, p. 86: Throughout we know spiritual life only as supported, bound to the consciousness of living individuals. [...] In like manner we know no consciousness without organic carriers and no organic life that is not tied to a very definite structure of inanimate nature providing air, water, and nutritive substance of various kinds.
kinetic and the mental than the bodily. Hence we may range the border types thus:

i) kinetic and bodily,

iv) static and mental.

But what to do with two other types, i.e. kinetic and mental, and static and bodily? Which criterion of two is stronger: being kinetic/static or being mental/bodily? Should we think that the order is

ii) kinetic and mental,

iii) static and bodily,

or:

ii) static and bodily,

iii) kinetic and mental?

This is where, I think, application of Ribot’s explicit criteria comes out. In Ribot what is dynamic is closer to body and what is static is reflection–like. Dynamic versus static distinction rendered as closeness to body versus reflection–likeness means also being exteriorised versus being interiorised. Although Epicurus’ fourfold hierarchy looks more complex than Ribot’s twofold hierarchy, the sense of Ribot’s hierarchy is expressed fully in his rule positing that every feeling loses its strength in the measure that it becomes intellectualised. For example a child expresses his feelings more or more strongly or more often than an adult whose motor–muscular reactions are weaker. But it doesn’t mean that the latter’s affective life is poorer. It is just expressed somatically to a lesser degree and, to use Epicurus’ term, to wit less kinetic, more katastematic. In this respect katastematic would simply mean deep and kinetic shallow. Anyone who agrees with this and agrees with applying Ribot’s rule to Epicurus’ model will answer with ease at the question about the order of ii) and iii):

i) kinetic and bodily,

ii) static and bodily,

iii) kinetic and mental,

iv) static and mental.

In the light of my interpretation the four categories can be converted into i) bodily–bodily, ii) bodily–mental, iii) mental–bodily, and iv) mental–mental. At first glance it looks strange, but this is correct since what they amount to are four levels of affectivity:

i) purely bodily

ii) predominantly (but not exclusively) bodily,

iii) predominantly (but not exclusively) mental,

iv) purely mental.

If now I try to re/construct the full panorama of affective phenomena in the part elaborated by Epicurus and Ribot – provided they meant the same province of affectivity – the following picture can be proposed:

i) passions are prolonged and intellectualized emotions,

ii) of them some are even more intellectualized – these are static passions, and some are less – dynamic passions,

iii) of those static passions some are more bodily and some are rather mental and, of those less intellectualized, i.e. dynamic, some are, again, rather bodily while others are rather mental.

In form of graph it can be represented thus:

\[
\text{Sentiments} = \\
i) \text{affective states proper} \\
+ ii) \text{emotions} \\
+ iii) \text{passions =} \\
\text{iii.i) dynamic} \\
\quad (\text{iii.i.i) bodily} \\
\quad + \text{iii.i.ii) mental}) \\
+ \text{iii.ii) static} \\
\quad (\text{iii.ii.i) bodily} \\
\quad + \text{iii.ii.ii) mental}).
\]

or, alternatively:

\[
\text{Sentiments} = \\
i) \text{affective states proper} \\
+ ii) \text{emotions} \\
+ iii) \text{prolonged and intellectualized emotions =} \\
\text{iii.i) emotion–like (a strong motor element, bodily)} \\
\quad (\text{iii.i.i) bodily (impulse–like and manifest}) \\
\quad + \text{iii.i.ii) mental (reflection–like and hidden}) \\
+ \text{iii.ii) reflection–like (a strong intellectual element, mental)} \\
\quad (\text{iii.ii.i) bodily (impulse–like and manifest}) \\
\quad + \text{iii.ii.ii) mental (reflection–like and hidden}),
\]

or, in the end:

\[
\text{Sentiments} = \\
i) \text{affective states proper} \\
+ ii) \text{emotions} \\
+ iii) \text{prolonged and intellectualized emotions =} \\
\text{iii.i) bodily–bodily (= purely bodily)} \\
\quad + \text{iii.ii) bodily–mental (= predominantly bodily)} \\
\quad + \text{iii.iii) mental–bodily (= predominantly mental)} \\
\quad + \text{iii.iv) mental–mental (= purely mental)}.
\]

Examples of the four types, kinds or levels would be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>category</th>
<th>example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) bodily and kinetic/dynamic</td>
<td>a pleasure resulting from a motion such as a massage, drinking, eating, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The pair manifest versus hidden corresponds to exteriorised versus interiorised or expressed bodily versus intellectualised. See Th. Ribot, Problèmes de psychologie affective, p. 20: [...], la sensibilité statique, immanente (plaisir–douleur) et la sensibilité dynamique, active, qui se manifeste par des mouvements [...].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>bodily and katastematic/static</th>
<th>a pleasure resulting from a motionless lying on a sunbed on the beach and being warmed by the sun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ii) mental and kinetic/dynamic</td>
<td>a pleasure resulting from acquiring knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) mental and katastematic/static</td>
<td>a pleasure resulting from possessing knowledge¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I think a correction is needed because the two last categories (iii and iv)) are, in my view, too abstract: what would possessing knowledge mean? Ribot draws a distinction between two mental acts, two kinds of memory: static memory, which consists in keeping/having in mind and dynamic memory, which is remembering². Memory is also provided as a useful example for distinguishing bodily and mental pleasure³. This looks correct, since in bodily feelings body or physical objects are given as present while in mental feelings they are given as either past, present or future. However true and applicable to the past and the future, this is not sufficient to distinguish a mental feeling from a bodily one when the former is directed at a present body or a present physical object.

Let me then try the following. My initial idea of considering listening to music is futile insofar as we know about Cicero’s report, a passage from Epicurus in Latin translation, according to which listening to music is of the same kind of pleasure as any pleasure related to the senses and external objects⁴. There are those who raise the question about Cicero’s account’s

¹ For D. Konstan, Epicurean Happiness: A Pig’s Life?, p. 17, n. 27, [t]he knowledge that we have friends would thus be the source of kinetic, not katastematic pleasure [...] insofar as, p. 17, it helps instill a sense of security against dangers. [H]appiness, D. Konstan, Epicurean Happiness: A Pig’s Life?, p. 19, claims, was not a matter of acquiring transcendental wisdom but simply the state of mental and physical well—being that is the natural condition of human beings. To this I want to answer that maybe a knowledge in this very particular moment of being protected against a danger is a kinetic pleasure. It is, however, different to affective awareness of being friend. Next, ataraxy is a negative term and as such it doesn’t grasp the very content of the state in question: it says what it is not rather than what it is. Saying that it amounts to possession of knowledge or is attained by knowledge may be a better description of its content. Obviously the difficulty is that if one thinks here about the whole of knowledge which is unattainable by a human being (vide Stoic sage), the picture will be inappropriate or katastematic pleasure is but a goal.

² See Th. Ribot, Problèmes de psychologie affective, p. 72: Ceci nous conduit à une autre remarque. On distingue dans la mémoire: la conservation, l’état statique et la reproduction, l’état dynamique [...].

³ See T. O’Keefe, Epicureanism, p. 118: Mental pleasures and pains, unlike bodily pleasures and pains, are not confined to the present, but span the past, present and future. As I understand O’Keefe, the difference is that there is no second order bodily pleasures and pain: a remembered bodily pleasure or pain can produce only a mental, not a bodily, pleasure or pain. I don’t know if this is true. A recollection, say, of warm holidays that in wintertime makes my body warm, or, at least, a feeling of warmth may be relevant.

⁴ See M. Tullius Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, (ed.) M. Pohlenz, 3, 41: “nec equidem habeo, quod intellegam bonum illud, detrahens eas voluptates quae sapore percipiantur, detrahens eas quae rebus percipiantur veneriis, detrahens eas quae auditu e cantibus, detrahens eas etiam quae ex formis percipiantur oculis suavis motiones [...] (transl. Peabody: “Nor is there anything which I can understand to be good, if we omit from our estimate those pleasures which are perceived by the taste, those which are perceived by the hearing and in music, those agreeable movements which the eye perceives in external forms [...]”).
reliability regarding Epicurus’ thought. I am not able to arbitrate about that and I prefer not to exploit this objection. But even if Cicero’s quote of Epicurus is trustworthy and, consequently, this is Epicurus’ view that a pleasure stemming from hearing music is catalogued in one box with pleasures produced by taste and any external sense, all these examples pertain to kinetic pleasures, either bodily or mental. Yet many will still agree that in another respect pleasure of hearing music is different to having a sensual pleasure when the ear is massaged. The difference is much the same as between mental and bodily pleasures. Here we have bodily and mental pleasures exemplified but still there is no solid example of katastematic (static) mental pleasure. To this end please think about a person who reading a sheet music organizes the music in his mind and has a pleasant or even the most pleasant experience, especially if he is of an opinion that no interpretation is good enough to represent the piece of music which the sheet music he is going through. No motion of external object – no sound, no sound – no music. Or if you prefer: no senses – no external object. A look at sheet music is completed with the help of the eyes, yet this is not the look that provides pleasure. Hence no motion other than motion of thought and I believe that a pleasure of reading a sheet of music by a person able to construct the music written in the sheet music she reads is a fine example of mental katastematic/static pleasure. Therefore my examples are now:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii) mental and kinetic/dynamic</td>
<td>a pleasure resulting from hearing a performance of music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv) mental and katastematic/static</td>
<td>a pleasure resulting from conceiving a piece of music when looking over a sheet of music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An attempt at hierarchisation of the whole of affectivity unfolded at four layers was made by Max Scheler. In his model four well–delineated levels of

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1 See J. C. B. Gosling & C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, p. 385: Further, Cicero is clearly unsympathetic to Epicurus, and while he obviously finds it difficult to make consistent sense of him, he is not predisposed to try too hard. The passage cited from II.i.9–10 (19.4.14) on variation of pleasure shows either that Epicurus was very confused or Cicero has got him wrong: the passage does not suggest that Cicero understood much from his source. And again, pp. 393–394: [...] it needs emphasizing once more that Cicero’s interpretation stands in need of defence: it is not supported by extant writings of Epicurus, and attributes views to him which ought to be surprising.

2 Not to be confounded with a pleasure arising from seeing a pretty piece of sheet music. See T. Mann, *Doctor Faustus*, pp. 60–62 about a lecture of Kretschmer’s called ”Music and the Eye”.

Epicurus’ hedonai katastematikai and kata kinesin versus Ribot’s Static...

feeling are sensible feelings, vital feelings, psychic feelings, and spiritual feelings. Yet his description is scanty or, at best, unfinished. Personally I tried to develop the fourfold model of affectivity, both in relation with what Scheler suggested and on my own. I used concepts of part and whole to build a model of four categories: (i) part–body, (ii) whole–body, (iii) part–psyche, (iv) whole–psyche, corresponding both to

i) kinetic and bodily,
ii) static and bodily,
iii) kinetic and mental,
iv) static and mental,

and to

iii.i) bodily–bodily (= purely bodily),
iii.ii) bodily–mental (= predominantly bodily),
iii.iii) mental–bodily (= predominantly mental),
iii.iv) mental–mental (= purely mental).

My model is still in progress and can be indicated only as a timid proposal.

8. A Final Conclusion

I have undertaken to try comparing Epicurus and Ribot because of terminological, conceptual and taxonomical similarities in their distinctions concerning the variety of affective phenomena. If my purpose were purely historical, it would be crucial to have Epicurus’ distinction applicable to other phenomena than pleasures. But it is historical only to a limited extent. It is rather about using ancient and modern intuitions to the benefit of the philosophy of affectivity. More especially:

i) Ribot is used to examine a question concerning Epicurus’ distinction from a new perspective,

ii) more generally, the Epicurus–cum–Ribot approach is used to grasp better, this is in a more comprehensive way, a variety of affective phenomena,

iii) variety of affective phenomena is structured in a hierarchy; to say more about it is difficult, if not impossible, but what has been told is in my view sufficient evidence against reductive models of affectivity which are again and again over-represented in current debates.

Let me finish by quoting the end of Epicurus’ letter to Idomeneus written on his final day:

On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could

1 M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics..., p. 332.
2 See R. Zaborowski, Max Scheler’s model of stratified affectivity..., pp. 24–34.
3 See R. Zaborowski, Max Scheler’s model of stratified affectivity...

4 E.g. in relation with a feature of expressibility of feelings, see R. Zaborowski, Is the Control of Emotion Possible?, p. 40.
5 See R. Zaborowski, Investigating Affectivity in light of Hartmann’s Layered Structure of Reality, p. 220. The group of joy is mentioned.
augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations.¹

We get here two kinds of affective state, each of them being of different order or level². They are synchronic but do not merge with one another. This is why I prefer rather than to agree with D. Wolfsdorf, who takes this context to be a case of what Plato would call mixed psychosomatic pleasure³, to opt for a multilevel (here: two-level) approach to affectivity. Not merging is a confirmation of clear distinctness of two levels. If we don’t accept plurality of levels, the law of non–contradiction is impugned since it then looks as if Epicurus’ experiences were pleasant and unpleasant at the same time. But if we agree that on the one level they are unpleasant while on the other pleasant and if Epicurus’ physical sufferings – even if continual – belong to the category of bodily and kinetic pleasure and his gladness belongs to the category of mental and katastematic pleasure, we have got a direct picture of the co–existence of two affective levels. This is, unfortunately, only an incomplete support for my model since there is neither bodily and katastematic nor mental and kinetic level referred to by Epicurus in the above passage⁴.

Something similar happened to Luther after his daughter’s death. He also alludes to two levels, but not exactly the same. We should probably interpret them as mental and katastematic on the one hand and bodily and katastematic on the other:

“I am happy in my spirit, yet very sad in my flesh. It is a strange thing indeed to know that she rests in peace and that she is well, yet still to be so sad.”⁵

This and other examples⁶ concur with Epicurus’ distinction in fr. 2 and with the description of his situation in his last letter.

A more general conclusion pertains to the variety and richness of affectivity. I think that it is correct to say that affectivity is recognized as multifaceted even by a monist philosophy such as Epicurus’ atomism. In other


² B. Nikolsky, Epicurus on Pleasure, p. 444 refers to this passage but all he says about it is that sometimes a kinetic pleasure can quite well compensate for the absence of a static pleasure.

³ D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 180.

⁴ Rarely are scholars as explicit in their classification as D. Wolfsdorf, Pleasure in Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 149: bodily & katastematic = ἀπονία (freedom from bodily pain), bodily & kinetic = εὐφροσύνη (delight), mental & katastematic = ἀταραξία (tranquillity, freedom from mental pain), mental & kinetic = ἄρα (joy).

⁵ Quoted after M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics ..., p. 331, n. 112.

⁶ See e.g. M. Scheler, Formalism in Ethics ..., p. 331: One can also be “serene” and “calm” while experiencing a serious misfortune, for instance, a great loss of property, whereas it is impossible to be “joyful” in this situation. One can also drink a glass of wine while being unhappy and still enjoy the bouquet of the wine. [...] A serene face remains serene, even while crying. The fact that there is no blending into one feeling, as is the case in feeling of such diverse levels of depth, points to the fact that feelings are not only of different qualities but also of different levels of depth.
words, it is hardly possible to account for affectivity without taking into consideration its multilayeredness\(^1\), though the autonomy and order of the two sets of divisions can be reconstructed only as highly hypothetical because of the way they are portrayed. The exact meaning of \(\mu \varepsilon \iota \zeta \omicron \omicron \alpha \zeta\) in DL 10, 137, 5 is not perfectly transparent, but it must pertain to a hierarchy\(^2\), because, as told above, any mental pleasure is considered greater than any bodily one. Accordingly this allows us, I think, to translate the quantitative distinction into a qualitative one, even if, I don’t stop insisting on it, the exact character of the distinction itself is hard to elucidate and subject to hypothesizing.

Having said that, I acknowledge that in this paper I attach less importance to historical reconstruction of Epicurus’ position. What does interest me is to draw on Epicurus’ and Ribot’s concepts, which, I find, are concurring to the extent I tried to demonstrate. To see if and how they may help us to understand a variety of affectivity structured in the form of hierarchy is, I hope, refreshing.

**Bibliography**


\(^1\) Strangely enough, multilevelness is a feature of affectivity recognized by both Epicureanism and Stoicism, for the Stoics, who are famous supporters of a complete eradication – *apatheia* – can hardly be considered as such. What they evacuate by one door, they reintroduce by another as *eupatheiai*. It is not that curious to see that for Ribot ήδη ην κινήσει is exclusive with apathy (see above). It could be wondered if Ribot doesn’t indicate the link between Epicurean and Stoic views of affectivity: what is *katastematic* in Epicurus amounts to *eupatheiai* in the Stoics.

\(^2\) Since \(\mu \varepsilon \iota \zeta \omicron \omicron \alpha \zeta\) is contrasted with \(\chi \varepsilon \iota \zeta \omicron \omicron\) (in: DL 10, 137, 1–2: [...] εις μεν γάρ \(\chi \varepsilon \iota \zeta \omicron \omicron\) τας σωματικας αλγηδόνας την \(\psi υ\zeta \zeta \omicron \omicron\) [...] transl. Hicks: [...] they [i.e. the Cyrenaeics] hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains [...] ), \(\mu \varepsilon \iota \zeta \omicron \omicron \alpha \zeta\) may also mean *better*. 


Ribot Th., *Essai sur les passions*, Félix Alcan, Paris 1907.


